Central African Republic

TJET Focus Country

This page presents a country report and describes data that TJET has compiled on regime transitions, intrastate conflict episodes, and transitional justice mechanisms. For details on the data included on this page, view the FAQ.

For Central African Republic, TJET has collected information on: nine amnesties between 1984 and 2019; 14 domestic trials starting between 1986 and 2020; one foreign trial starting in 2020; six international trials starting between 2008 and 2019; and two truth commissions mandated between 2003 and 2019.

Select any transitional justice mechanism in the table below to view a timeline in the figure.

Conflict Year

Democratic Transition Year

Author of country report: Patrick Vinck

Introduction

The Central African Republic has experienced over 60 years of political instability and violence since gaining independence from France in 1960. Throughout this turbulent history, periods of authoritarian rule, military coups, and intrastate conflicts have severely undermined stability and the rule of law in the country.

After a brief democratic opening in the early 1990s, the country descended back into conflict as President Ange-Félix Patassé struggled to ward off coup attempts and consolidate power. This instability culminated in François Bozizé’s 2003 coup, which plunged CAR into a new phase of violence and human rights abuses. In 2013, the largely Muslim Séléka rebel coalition seized the capital, prompting retaliation from Christian Anti-Balaka militias and unleashing a sectarian civil war. Over half the population was displaced as widespread atrocities were committed along religious lines. To this day, the country continues to struggle with instability and violent conflict.

In the aftermath of these crises, transitional justice has become a priority for rebuilding the rule of law and addressing CAR’s legacy of violence. Various mechanisms have been established, including domestic prosecutions, truth commissions, and the Special Criminal Court. However, implementation has faced significant challenges due to ongoing insecurity, lack of political will, and the complexity of reconciling justice, peace, and stability in such a volatile context.

Regime Context

Based on well-known democracy data, TJET records one democratic transition starting in 1993.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

In general elections held in August of that year, Ange-Félix Patassé’s Movement for the Liberation of the Central African People (MLPC) defeated the Patriotic Front for Progress (FPP). Though incumbent leader André Kolingba clung to power, he ultimately stepped aside under international pressure. The country thus underwent its first peaceable transfer of power. Today, CAR is nominally a democratic republic with concerns about democratic backsliding and the integrity of democratic processes, as the country continues to struggle with ongoing instability, violence, and a weak rule of law.

CAR gained independence from France in 1960, establishing a republic under President David Dacko. However, the country’s economy rapidly declined as Dacko consolidated power and officially abolished all political parties in 1962 except his own Social Evolution Movement of Black Africa (Mouvement d’Évolution Sociale de l’Afrique Noire; MESAN). Political parties were not allowed again until 1991. Amid threats of nationwide strikes, Jean-Bédel Bokassa, a military officer, overthrew Dacko in 1966, ushering in an authoritarian period. Bokassa abolished the constitution, dissolved the legislature, and allowed no opposition while maintaining support from France. He declared himself president for life in 1972, and four years later, in 1976, crowned himself emperor. His regime became synonymous with brutal repression, including the 1979 massacre of protesting schoolchildren, ultimately leading to his ouster by French forces later that year.

Following Bokassa’s removal, Dacko briefly returned to power with little popular support before being ousted again in 1981 by General André Kolingba, who established another military regime. In 1985, the military committee that ruled the country was abolished and replaced by a cabinet including some civilians. The following year, a new constitution was approved and adopted, and legislative elections were held in 1987. In practice, however, Kolingba maintained all power, and his rule did little to stabilize the country; rather, he fueled ethnic divisions and suppressed dissent.

By 1991, riots had broken out among dissatisfied Central Africans, and Kolingba faced pressure to organize open elections. He allowed political parties to form and name presidential candidates. The subsequent 1993 presidential elections marked a significant shift towards democracy with the election of Ange-Félix Patassé, the leader of the Central African People’s Liberation Movement (Mouvement pour la Libération du Peuple Centrafricain; MLPC). Kolingba failed to pass the first round of balloting. However, Patassé’s presidency was marred by mutinies and multiple attempted coups, reflecting an overall power vacuum. In 1997, the government signed the Bangui Accords with opposition parties and religious groups. At the same time, France withdrew its last troops from the country, while a UN mission was deployed (MINURCA - UN Mission to the Central African Republic) to maintain security and support the 1998 legislative elections, ultimately won by Patassé’s MLPC.

The country, however, remained largely unstable as coup attempts continued until François Bozizé seized power from Patassé in 2003. Bozizé’s transition regime drafted and approved a new constitution and claimed legitimacy through elections held in 2005. However, the newly appointed government was marked by allegations of corruption, electoral fraud, and repression. Ongoing conflicts in the northern part of the country in the late 2000s were followed by ceasefire agreements, which were never fully implemented. The following presidential elections, delayed from 2010 to 2011, saw the return of both Patassé and Bozizé among the candidates. Bozizé was declared the winner, with 66 percent of the vote, amidst allegations of fraud and complaints of rigged elections.

The elections did little to bring stability. By 2012, the Séléka rebellion, a coalition of various armed groups, had taken control of much of the CAR territory outside Bangui. The rebellion plunged CAR into a sectarian conflict, with the mainly Muslim Séléka pitted against the largely Christian Anti-Balaka militias. In 2013, the Séléka and Bozizé’s government entered a power-sharing agreement, but Bozizé’s failure to honor the agreement prompted the Séléka to seize power.

Michel Djotodia, one of the Séléka leaders, initially claimed to adhere to the power-sharing agreement. However, he quickly suspended the constitution and dissolved the National Assembly and the government, a move met with both domestic and international resistance. This prompted the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to intervene, recommending the establishment of a national transitional council to guide the country to elections. Djotodia agreed, and by April, the council was formed, with Djotodia being elected as its president and formally inaugurated on August 18, 2013. Despite these changes, the interim government struggled to assert control, particularly over the Séléka rebels, who continued their violent rampage across the country, committing acts of violence, rape, and kidnapping. In response to the anarchic situation and the retaliatory formation of primarily Christian Anti-Balaka militias, the cycle of violence between Christian and Muslim communities escalated dramatically, prompting fears of genocide.

In an effort to stabilize the situation, the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of an African-led peacekeeping force and additional French troops in December 2013. Despite these efforts, by the year’s end, the humanitarian situation remained dire, with substantial displacement and widespread need for aid. By early 2014, Djotodia and his prime minister had resigned under regional pressure. Catherine Samba-Panza, the mayor of Bangui, was subsequently elected as the new interim president and inaugurated later that month. Despite a ceasefire signed in July 2014 between the Séléka and Anti-Balaka forces, insecurity persisted. The United Nations Security Council approved a UN-led peacekeeping mission in April, which took operational control in September, attempting to restore order where previous efforts had faltered.

The transitional government organized the Bangui National Forum in May 2015 to solidify peace and restore governance. This assembly brought together transitional authorities, militia representatives, and civil society, resulting in an agreement on disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation (DDRR) of militia members. This was followed by a constitutional referendum in December 2015, approving a new constitution aimed at rebuilding and stabilizing the country. Despite logistical issues, general elections were conducted, leading to a presidential runoff in early 2016 between former prime ministers Anicet Georges Dologuélé and Faustin-Archange Touadéra, with Touadéra emerging victorious. Touadéra was re-elected in 2020-2021 general elections that were affected by violence and the Covid-19 pandemic. In 2023, Touadéra forced a contested referendum to extend presidential terms and abolish term limits, with 95% of the votes in favor of the change. While progress has been made, the Central African Republic remains plagued by instability, violence, and humanitarian crises.

Conflict Context

Based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, TJET records ten violent intrastate conflict episodes between 2001 and 2020 (during 14 calendar years), involving eight distinct armed opposition groups fighting against the government. Eight conflict episodes were internationalized by involvement of external state actors.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions. Source: UCDP Dyadic Dataset version 23.1, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/index.html#dyadic.

Since gaining independence from France in 1960, the Central African Republic (CAR) has endured multiple violent regime changes and prolonged periods of internal armed conflict that have impacted millions of civilians. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and TJET records, there were ten violent intrastate conflict episodes between 2001 and 2020, spanning 14 calendar years. These conflicts involved eight distinct armed opposition groups fighting against the government, with eight episodes internationalized by the involvement of external state actors. The history of these conflicts closely mirrors the country’s regime changes.

The country’s first president, David Dacko, was overthrown in a 1966 coup by Jean-Bédel Bokassa, who established a brutal authoritarian regime until his removal in 1979 by French military intervention. Dacko was reinstalled as president but was once again overthrown. Subsequently, a military regime under General André Kolingba ruled until domestic and international pressure led to presidential elections in 1993. Ange-Félix Patassé won these elections but failed to stabilize the country. Starting in 1996, a series of army mutinies erupted over unpaid wages, highlighting deeper issues related to governance and inclusion.

Kolingba and his supporters, including significant elements within the national military (Forces Armées Centrafricaines, FACA), remained influential and occasionally antagonistic toward Patassé’s new government, culminating in a coup attempt in 2001. Simultaneously, tensions between President Patassé and army chief François Bozizé led to a failed coup attempt by Bozizé, who was later pardoned but continued to pose a threat to Patassé’s rule. To fend off the coup attempts, Patassé enlisted the support of Jean-Pierre Bemba and his rebel group, the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), from the DRC. Their involvement was marked by severe human rights abuses, including massacres and systematic rape, leading to Jean-Pierre Bemba’s trial and conviction (later overturned) by the International Criminal Court (ICC). By 2003, Bozizé launched another successful coup, overthrowing Patassé with support from neighboring Chad.

Bozizé’s rise to power through an undemocratic coup set the stage for further conflict with rebel groups, allegedly receiving support from Chad and Sudan. Between 2005 and 2008, at least two major rebel groups—the Popular Army for the Restoration of Democracy (APRD) and the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UFDR)—emerged in opposition to Bozizé’s government in the northwest and northeast parts of the country, respectively, seizing large portions of territory. Peace agreements in 2007 failed to resolve the underlying grievances fueling the rebellions. The Convention of Patriots for Justice and Peace (CPJP), formed around 2008 in the northeastern part of the country, also clashed with the government and, at times, other rebel groups. These clashes often revolved around control of territory and resources, which are scarce in many parts of CAR. The CPJP ultimately agreed to a peace deal in 2014. By 2012, however, a new coalition of rebel groups called Séléka began launching attacks against Bozizé’s government, demonstrating widespread opposition. By March 2013, Séléka had become a major insurgency, ultimately overthrowing Bozizé. However, Séléka’s violence against civilians sparked retaliation by Anti-Balaka militias seeking to defend Christian communities, plunging the country into civil war.

Over the next several years, the fighting involved numerous armed factions and resulted in horrific human rights abuses against civilians. The UN estimated that by 2014, one-quarter of CAR’s population had been displaced, and hundreds of thousands had fled as refugees. Séléka and Anti-Balaka forces became increasingly sectarian, targeting civilians along religious lines in a conflict described as having genocidal potential. Splinter groups of Séléka, including the Front Populaire pour la Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) and the Union for Peace in the Central African Republic (UPC), emerged in 2014-2015, often clashing with both Anti-Balaka groups and other former Séléka factions over control of territory and resources.

International interventions by French and African Union forces helped curb some of the worst violence but failed to achieve lasting peace. It was not until February 2019 that the government and 14 armed groups signed a new peace agreement. However, even this accord has proven fragile. The Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) was formed in 2020 as an alliance of several armed groups, including both former Séléka factions like the FPRC and anti-balaka groups. The creation of the CPC reflects a strategic realignment among CAR’s rebel factions, uniting to oppose the government of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra. As of 2021, over two-thirds of the country remains controlled by rebel factions, and hundreds of thousands of civilians remain displaced within CAR and abroad.

Other conflicts

Separately, the CAR has also been subjected to violence that emanated from conflict in the Darfur region of neighboring Sudan from the mid-2000s into the 2010s. The country has also experienced atrocities by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a Ugandan rebel group. Originally based in northern Uganda, the LRA moved its operations into the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the early 2000s. Following a military offensive at the end of 2008, primarily led by the Ugandan army with support from other nations and international bodies, the LRA was pushed deeper into the Central African Republic and South Sudan. These incursions by the LRA into the CAR have been characterized by brutal attacks on villages, abductions, and killings, adding to the complex security challenges faced by the country. The LRA’s presence in CAR peaked around 2010 but continued to pose a significant threat for several years, leading to further military and peacekeeping efforts to track down LRA fighters and their notorious leader, Joseph Kony. Despite a reduction in its activities in recent years due to concerted military pressure and the defection of several key members, the legacy of the LRA’s brutal campaign continues to affect the communities it targeted.

Transitional Justice

As of 2020, the Central African Republic ranks 18th out of 174 on TJET’s Legacy of Violence index. TJET has recorded data on nine amnesties between 1984 and 2019, 14 domestic prosecutions between 1986 and 2020, six international prosecutions between 2008 and 2019, two truth commissions in 2003 and 2019, and two UN investigations between 2013 and 2014. The transitional justice efforts can be broadly discussed around three periods: Before 2003, 2003 to 2012, and after 2012.

Transitional Justice before 2003

Prior to 2003, there were no formal transitional justice mechanisms in CAR. The focus was on political amnesties as a tool to promote peace and reconciliation. These amnesties were often granted to combatants and political opponents to encourage peace and national unity, but they were typically not part of a broader, structured transitional justice strategy, and rather contributed to cycles of impunity. One exception is the 1986 trial of Jean-Bedel Bokassa for crimes against humanity, including cannibalism, murder, and embezzlement during his reign. However, he was granted amnesty under President André Kolingba, along with all convicts, indicted persons, and prisoners in the country. Amnesties continued under President Patassé’s regime, notably for soldiers responsible for mutiny and uprisings against the government in 1996 and 1997.

Transitional Justice between 2003 and 2012

After François Bozizé seized power in 2003, CAR experienced some notable transitional justice efforts, though these efforts were sporadic and often disrupted by ongoing instability and violence. Shortly after the coup, there was an initiative to create a Truth and Reconciliation Commission as part of broader efforts to achieve national reconciliation. The aim of the TRC was to identify the causes of the Central African Republic’s crises between 1960 and 2003. The work of the TRC was divided into six sub-commissions focusing mainly on political, security, economic, and social issues. However, this early attempt did not lead to a fully functional commission, and its impact was limited.

Similar to previous regimes, Bozizé’s government used political amnesties. In 2003, Bozizé issued amnesties to his own troops for previous coup attempts. Broad amnesties were offered in 2008 to rebels and armed forces members. These amnesties were justified as promoting peace but often included unrealistic demands from rebel groups, while protecting Bozizé’s allies, resulting in impunity for serious crimes and failing to address the demands for justice by victims of human rights violations. Bozizé also issued a posthumous amnesty to Emperor Jean-Bedel Bokassa in 2010.

This period also saw the first eight human rights domestic prosecutions. Perhaps more significantly, the CAR government referred in 2004 the situation concerning the crimes committed since 2002 to the ICC, marking the beginning of the ICC’s involvement in the country. The ICC’s Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, opened an investigation in 2007. This investigation focused primarily on crimes committed during the 2002-2003 conflict, including killings, rapes, and acts of looting. The most notable ICC actions during this period were the arrest and trial of Jean-Pierre Bemba, a Congolese militia leader and vice president, whose forces were accused of committing crimes in CAR during 2002-2003. Bemba was charged with two counts of crimes against humanity and three counts of war crimes. His trial, which began in 2010, was a landmark case as it highlighted the concept of command responsibility, holding leaders accountable for their troops’ actions.

Transitional justice after 2012

2012 marked the rise of the Séléka rebellion that thrust CAR into a brutal sectarian conflict. It was followed by significant developments aimed at addressing the widespread violence and human rights abuses that have plagued the country.

The most significant efforts resulted from the Bangui National Forum, held in May 2015, which called for the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Special Criminal Court. In response, a Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Reconciliation Commission (TJRRC) was proposed to focus on truth-telling, reparations, and fostering reconciliation among communities. It was officially created and became operational in 2020, with the commissioners sworn in and starting their work in 2021. However, the TJRRC has struggled to get off the ground.

With the support of the international community, the CAR government established the Special Criminal Court (SCC) in 2015 as a hybrid court that includes international and national judges and staff. Its mandate is to investigate and prosecute those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity in CAR since 2003. The SCC did not initiate its first trial over war crimes and crimes against humanity until 2022, following delays in operationalizing the court and executing arrest warrants. Concerns around the lack of transparency, fair trial rights of suspects, and political interference undermine trust in the work of the court. At the same time, prosecutions in ordinary courts continue, although minimally, fostering an overall sense of impunity. The ICC, however, has continued its involvement in CAR, opening a new investigation in 2014 into further alleged crimes committed since 2012. This was in response to the violence perpetrated by both the Séléka and the Anti-Balaka groups. The ICC has ongoing cases and prosecutions, including against prominent figures in the Anti-Balaka movement (Alfred Yekatom, Patrice-Edouard Ngaïssona, Maxime Jeoffroy Eli Mokom Gawaka) and Séléka group (Mahamat Said Abdel Kani, Mahamat Nouradine Adam).

Finally, the 2019 peace agreement signed between the government and 14 armed groups included amnesties for lower-level combatants of the armed groups involved, excluding leaders, those accused of serious crimes, and those under international sanctions or indictments.

Together, these initiatives highlight serious attempts to address impunity for war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as the difficulties in implementing transitional justice mechanisms in a context of ongoing conflict and political instability. The effectiveness of transitional justice in CAR remains hindered by political will and interference, recurring violence, inadequate funding, and logistical challenges.

Transitional Justice Data

As of 2020, Central African Republic ranks 18th out of 174 on TJET’s legacy of violence index. For a full list of country rankings over time, view the index page, and for an explanation of the index, view the Methods & FAQs page.

Amnesties

Central African Republic had nine amnesties between 1984 and 2019. Two occurred in the context of democratic transition. One was passed during ongoing internal armed conflict. Two were passed after internal armed conflict. Two were part of a peace agreement. Four amnesties released political prisoners. One amnesty forgave human rights violations.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

Domestic Trials

TJET has compiled data on 14 domestic prosecutions between 1986 and 2020. These include eight regular human rights prosecutions of state agents, in which three persons were convicted; two intrastate conflict prosecutions of state agents, in which no one was convicted; and four intrastate conflict prosecutions of opposition members, in which ten persons were convicted.

Click on accused records for data on convictions. Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

International or Hybrid Trials

Nationals of Central African Republic were subject to six international prosecutions between 2008 and 2019, which led to three convictions. Central African Republic was referred to the ICC in 2004. The ICC's Office of the Prosecutor opened a preliminary examination of the situation in Central African Republic in 2005. The first investigation of a specific case began in 2007. Starting in 2008, the ICC issued eleven arrest warrants, ten of which resulted in court appearances. Proceedings began in eight cases between 2010 and 2022.

Click on accused records for data on convictions. Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

Foreign Trials

Nationals of Central African Republic were defendants in one foreign prosecution in France beginning in 2020.

Click on accused records for data on convictions. Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

Truth Commissions

Central African Republic mandated two truth commissions in 2003 and 2019. One completed its operations by 2003. One of the commissions issued a final report, which is publicly available. The report included recommendations for prosecutions, reparations, and institutional reforms.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

UN Investigations

Central African Republic was subject to two UN investigations between 2013 and 2014. One investigation aimed to encourage domestic prosecutions.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

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References

International Federation for Human Rights “War Crimes in the Central African Republic: ‘When the Elephants Fight, the Grass Suffers’,” research report (Paris: International Federation for Human Rights, February 2003), https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/FIDH_Report_WarCrimes_in_CAR_English_Feb2003.pdf.

International Crisis Group “Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State,” Policy Briefing (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, December 13, 2007).

Eric Berman and Louisa Lombard “The Central African Republic and Small Arms,” research report (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008).

Marlies Glasius “‘We Ourselves, We Are Part of the Functioning’: The ICC, Victims, and Civil Society in the Central African Republic,” African Affairs 108, no. 430 (2009): 49–67.

International Center for Transitional Justice “Regional Dynamics in Central Africa: Confronting Past Crimes at the National Level,” 2009, https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-CAR-ICC-Briefing-2009-English.pdf.

International Crisis Group “Central African Republic: Keeping the Dialogue Alive,” research report (Nairobi/Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 12, 2010), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/central-african-republic-keeping-dialogue-alive.

Patrick Vinck and Phuong Pham “Building Peace, Seeking Justice: A Population-Based Survey on Attitudes about Accountability and Social Reconstruction in the Central African Republic,” research report (Berkeley, CA: Human Rights Center, University of California, Berkeley, August 3, 2010).

Amnesty International “Central African Republic: Ethnic Cleansing and Sectarian Killings” (Amnesty International, February 12, 2014), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/02/central-african-republic-ethnic-cleansing-sectarian-violence/.

Tatiana Carayannis and Louisa Lombard Making Sense of the Central African Republic (London: Zed Books, 2015).

Tatiana Carayannis “Making Justice Work,” Foreign Affairs, April 5, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/central-african-republic/2016-04-05/making-justice-work.

Louisa Lombard State of Rebellion. Violence and Intervention in the Central African Republic (London: Zed Books, 2016).

Human Rights Watch “"Looking for Justice" The Special Criminal Court, a New Opportunity for Victims in the Central African Republic,” research report (Human Rights Watch, May 17, 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/05/17/looking-justice/special-criminal-court-new-opportunity-victims-central-african.

Enrica Picco “"I Am 100% Central African:" Identity and Inclusion in the Experience of Central African Muslim Refugees in Chad and Cameroon,” research report (New York: International Center for Transitional Justice, March 14, 2018), https://www.ictj.org/publication/i-am-100-central-african-identity-and-inclusion-experience-central-african-muslim.