Cote d’Ivoire
This page presents a country report and describes data that TJET has compiled on regime transitions, intrastate conflict episodes, and transitional justice mechanisms. For details on the data included on this page, view the FAQ.
For Cote d'Ivoire, TJET has collected information on: five amnesties between 1992 and 2018; 30 domestic trials starting between 1973 and 2016; two international trials starting between 2011 and 2012; one reparations policy created in 2015; and two truth commissions mandated between 2000 and 2011.
Select any transitional justice mechanism in the table below to view a timeline in the figure.
Author of country report: Luciana Vosniak
Introduction
Côte d’Ivoire is a presidential democracy in West Africa with a population of approximately 29 million people, occupying an important position in regional politics. Traditionally, its economy has been relatively robust compared to its neighbors due to the successful development and export of cocoa and foreign direct investment. However, since gaining independence from France in 1960, Côte d’Ivoire has experienced significant political turmoil and internal violence, which continues to impact its transition to a stable, democratic system of governance.
Following independence, the country remained under authoritarian one-party rule led by founding President Félix Houphouët-Boigny until his death in 1993. Subsequent attempts at democratic transition have been tumultuous, including a 1999 coup d’état and two civil wars from 2002-2004 that resumed in 2010-2011, plunging the nation into prolonged periods of conflict and instability. Côte d’Ivoire has also faced substantial international involvement in its domestic affairs, particularly in the wake of crises. France maintained close defense ties in the post-independence period. The 2002-2004 civil war saw Western powers and ECOWAS intervene by deploying peace forces and leading peace mediation and negotiations. The 2010-2011 post-election violence prompted UN and French military action that helped remove the president, Laurent Gbagbo, from power.
These crises created a tragic legacy of gross human rights violations such as extrajudicial killings, torture, rape, and other acts of violence targeting civilians. Conservative estimates indicate that the conflicts left over 3,000 dead and one million displaced internally and abroad. Multiple rebel factions emerged to challenge central authority, with hostilities ultimately ending through negotiated settlements. Nevertheless, the underlying ethnic and religious tensions that contributed to the onset of past violence remained.
Transitional governments have struggled with instability. While the 2016 constitution aimed to strengthen democratic governance, there are continuing concerns over the judiciary’s susceptibility to executive influence and the exclusion of some groups from the electoral process. Aiming to foster lasting peace in the wake of civil war and political violence, Côte d’Ivoire launched investigations, domestic prosecutions, a truth commission, and reparations. However, these mechanisms have been criticized as one-sided, politicized, and failing to achieve comprehensive accountability or adequate support for victims. Moreover, broad amnesties have been issued and were criticized for prioritizing stability over justice. Human rights experts warn that perceived impunity and lack of impartial, victim-centered approaches undermine the rule of law and national reconciliation needed to deter future crises. The continued strengthening of judicial independence and democratic reforms remains pivotal to consolidating peace in the country.
Regime Context
Based on well-known democracy data, TJET records one democratic transition starting in 2012.
Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.
Regime stability in the country has fluctuated significantly, with multiple periods of political turbulence. After gaining independence from France in 1960, President Félix Houphouët-Boigny established a one-party system that consolidated his power for over three decades until he died in 1993. Houphouët-Boigny’s rule through a one-party state represented the most authoritarian and repressive period in Côte d’Ivoire’s history, as the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI) systematically curtailed dissent through repressive tactics that stifled political pluralism. Student protests in the 1990s signaled rising dissent, which escalated upon Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993. Henri Konan Bédié was democratically elected but was later ousted in a 1999 coup led by General Robert Gueï, exacerbating religious and ethnic tensions.
Elections in 2000 brought Laurent Gbagbo to power amid opposition boycotts, setting the stage for civil war when disaffected northern forces declared independence as “the New Forces,” also known as Forces Nouvelles de Côte d’Ivoire (FNCI). On November 28, 2010, Alassanne Ouattara was elected president of Côte d’Ivoire in an election deemed legitimate by the Independent Electoral Commission, with the majority of the international community and the country’s prime minister recognizing Mr. Ouattara’s victory. However, the outgoing president, Laurent Gbagbo, did not acknowledge his defeat and refused to cede power, sparking renewed nationwide violence as Ouattara’s supporters battled to install him. French and UN forces captured Gbagbo in April 2011, allowing Ouattara to assume the presidency. This was the beginning of a democratic transition.
The transition has been turbulent. Contested presidential elections have become a recurring source of instability in Côte d’Ivoire. While the 2015 presidential elections proceeded peacefully and 2016 constitutional reforms aimed to strengthen governance, recent elections in October 2020 saw tensions and violence return, though less devastatingly than in previous years.
Côte d’Ivoire’s legal system is based on the French civil law tradition established in the constitution. The judiciary is headed by the Supreme Court, which oversees three primary bodies: the Court of Cassation handles civil and criminal cases; the Council of State reviews administrative disputes; and the Court of Auditors oversees public finances and accounting matters. An additional institution, the Constitutional Council, was created by law in 1994 to determine candidate eligibility for presidential and legislative elections and certify and announce final results. While courts are nominally independent, experts note that the judiciary remains susceptible to executive influence in practice. The impartiality of magistrates is also called into question, as human rights groups have documented corruption, ethnic favoritism, political biases, religious prejudice, and instances where the government marginalized opposition figures through the courts. Meaningful access to justice is also limited, as most citizens cannot regularly rely on the legal system to uphold their rights due to insufficient witness protection and a lack of legal aid programs.
Conflict Context
Based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, TJET records six violent intrastate conflict episodes between 2002 and 2011 (during four calendar years), involving five distinct armed opposition groups fighting against the government.
Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions. Source: UCDP Dyadic Dataset version 23.1, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/index.html#dyadic.
Côte d’Ivoire experienced two major civil wars in recent decades. The first began in September 2002 when rebels launched an insurgency against President Gbagbo’s regime, dividing the country between a rebel-held north and a government-controlled south. Fighting escalated through 2004, and then continued at a low level until warring parties reached a settlement in 2007. Just three years later, the conflict re-erupted following the disputed 2010 presidential election as Gbagbo refused to cede power to Ouattara.
Religious divisions between the Muslim north and Christian south provided context for the 2002-2004 conflict, known as the First Ivorian Civil War. The nation’s first president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, had maintained peace between regions, but successors struggled as tensions mounted in 2000. The arrival of large numbers of immigrants from neighboring Burkina Faso helped exacerbate conflict as Ivorians debated newcomers’ voting rights. On September 19, 2002, northern troops launched nationwide attacks against Gbagbo’s central government. Rebel forces eventually attacked Abidjan, the country’s capital and largest city. However, government forces retained control of Abidjan, Yamoussoukro, and most of the south while rebels seized the north and central city of Bouaké. Ceasefire attempts failed as fighting intensified at the end of 2002.
The main rebel group involved in the 2002-2004 conflict was the Forces Nouvelles de Côte d’Ivoire (FNCI), later renamed the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (RFCI). The FNCI was a coalition including the Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP), and Popular Movement of the Great West (MPIGO), drawing support from Côte d’Ivoire’s predominantly Muslim north. The National Armed Forces (FANCI, Forces armées nationales de Côte d’Ivoire) led by President Laurent Gbagbo recruited local militias and foreign mercenaries.
The First Ivorian Civil War ended with the 2007 Ouagadougou Political Agreement, a peace accord negotiated through regional mediation. The agreement included an accord to hold new elections, though delays meant they occurred only in 2010, five years after Gbagbo’s term expired.
Ouattara and Gbagbo ran against each other in 2010. Underlying tensions re-erupted, and civil war resumed when Gbagbo refused to concede defeat to Ouattara. Ouattara established a parallel northern government, and violent conflict ensued over the nation’s leadership. Western powers firmly intervened, backing the Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (RFCI) and Ouattara, justifying it as a humanitarian necessity to prevent Gbagbo’s forces from committing genocide against northern populations. On April 11, 2011, with French assistance, Ouattara’s forces stormed Gbagbo’s residence and arrested him. Stability returned in the second half of 2011, with the new government and the United Nations Peacebuilding Mission to Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) launching transitional justice efforts.
According to common estimates, the 2002-2004 civil war resulted in 1,700 deaths while displacing 750,000 within Côte d’Ivoire and neighboring countries. The post-election violence of 2010-2011 was even deadlier, leaving over 3,000 civilians dead and over one million displaced. Rights organizations have reported that all parties to the conflicts have committed human rights abuses during both conflicts, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and sexual violence targeting women and children.
International actors played an active role in both conflicts. France, the UN, and ECOWAS intervened during the 2002-2004 conflict, deploying peace forces and leading peace mediation and negotiations. France had a sizable resident population in Côte d’Ivoire, and in October 2002, initiated Operation Licorne to protect both French citizens and its interests during the Ivorian conflict. France also deployed forces already present in Côte d’Ivoire under defense agreements to aid other nationals and act as a buffer between warring factions. ECOWAS concurrently formed a contact group to facilitate discussions between opposing Ivorian factions. Western powers, the AU, the UN, and ECOWAS, also intervened during 2010-2011, supporting Ouattara’s intervention against Gbagbo. While stabilizing immediate crises, critics argue that international involvement in Côte d’Ivoire’s conflicts lacked balance and failed to deter future instability.
Transitional Justice
Côte d’Ivoire’s government has established various mechanisms intended to achieve comprehensive transitional justice in the country. However, no dedicated transitional justice legislation has ever been enacted. Mechanisms originated through executive decrees and agreements. Domestically, President Ouattara referred cases to the ICC and created a Special Investigation and Examination Unit (CSEI) in 2011 to investigate over 1,000 individuals for post-election violence crimes. Nevertheless, the CSEI was criticized for primarily targeting associates of Laurent Gbagbo while largely omitting other perpetrators, fueling claims of political bias. Progress was also slow, with few cases reaching trial by 2015 despite years of investigations. Critics also point out that those most responsible for violations during past conflicts were never charged. Data shows that most trials were of lower-ranked members of forces loyal to Gbagbo. While there were 12 domestic trials of individuals involved in the 2002-2004 and 2010-2011 civil wars, only three involved high-ranking officers.
Trials
At the international level, the landmark trial of former President Laurent Gbagbo at the International Criminal Court (ICC) from 2011-2019 represented an important step towards justice and accountability for Côte d’Ivoire. As the first former head of state tried at the ICC, Gbagbo faced charges of crimes against humanity related to the 2010-2011 election crisis. However, his highly publicized acquittal in March 2021 due to insufficient evidence polarized perceptions of the court’s independence and impartiality. Charles Blé Goudé –a close ally of Gbagbo who served as the youth minister in Gbagbo’s government and as the leader of the Young Patriots, a pro-Gbagbo militia group – was also tried by the ICC in 2011 but was acquitted.
The domestic trial of former First Lady Simone Gbagbo from 2016 to 2017 also attracted attention. She faced trial before Côte d’Ivoire’s highest criminal court in May 2016 for crimes against humanity allegedly perpetrated in the aftermath of the 2010-2011 national elections. She was ultimately acquitted in 2017 due to a lack of critical evidence connecting her to the alleged human rights crimes. Human rights organizations criticized the judicial process, arguing that the prosecution failed to conduct a proper and full investigation into her role in the post-election violence. As a result, the necessary evidence to prove her involvement was not collected.
In 2012, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for Simone Gbagbo concerning four counts of crimes against humanity allegedly committed during the 2010-2011 post-election violence. However, invoking the principle of complementarity and maintaining she could be tried domestically, Côte d’Ivoire refused her extradition to The Hague. The ICC warrant request was then vacated in June 2021.
Truth & Reparations
In addition to trials, justice efforts have included a Mediation Committee for National Reconciliation, a Commission on Dialogue, Truth and Reconciliation (CDVR), reparations, and an Authority for Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration (ADDR). These mechanisms have faced criticism, as the ADDR has largely failed to achieve its goals, and many victims have yet to receive the reparations they are owed. Rights organizations have affirmed that the processes were incomplete and biased because they failed to include any charges against Ouattara’s supporters or deal with the 2002-2004 civil war.
The Mediation Committee for National Reconciliation was a commission of inquiry established in Côte d’Ivoire from November 2000 to April 2001 through a presidential decree to investigate post-electoral violence in Abidjan that killed 171 people in October 2000. The committee, composed of 28 commissioners, did not issue a final report but recommended postponing legislative elections scheduled for December 2000 to maintain social peace.
In 2011, Côte d’Ivoire established the Truth, Dialogue, and Reconciliation Commission (CDVR) through a presidential decree to investigate the root causes of past conflicts and election violence. However, the CDVR was criticized for its poor design, political bias, failure to incorporate victim perspectives, and lack of meaningful dialogue throughout the process, resulting in partial and ineffective recommendations. The commission published its final report in 2014. According to CDVR’s report, 46.87% of violations occurred between 2011-2013. Of the total 72,574 identified violations, 7,486 were homicides, 1,995 were disappearances, 5,229 were severe injuries, and 5,466 were cases of torture or ill-treatment.
The National Commission for Reconciliation and Compensation for Victims (CONARIV) succeeded the CDVR’s reparations mandate in 2015. It identified 316,954 victims to compensate for violations that occurred between 1990-2011 during various civil wars and post-election violence but could only provide initial compensation to about 4,500 in an initial round of reparations in 2015. The reparations program has been widely criticized for lacking transparency and not providing meaningful guidance to victims on their rights and how to seek compensation. Most victims still do not know if they qualify or will receive support.
CONARIV submitted a report on its activities in April 2016, which revealed that over 64% of the 874,056 victim files submitted to the Audit Unit for review had been denied. Additionally, the agreed-upon list of victims requiring compensation still required final validation by the President, introducing a political element into the victim identification process. This top-down method of presidential approval for the victim list as part of the compensation process was criticized for bringing the overall credibility of the reparations scheme into question.
Amnesties
Broad amnesties were issued in 1992 and 2018 without public consultation, prioritizing stability over comprehensive accountability. In 2018, President Ouattara granted amnesties for around 800 people who had been prosecuted or sentenced for offenses related to the 2010 post-election crisis, including former first lady Simone Gbagbo. Ouattara’s approach was widely criticized for cementing a culture of impunity and failing to deter future abuses.
Vetting/lustration
No comprehensive vetting or lustration was undertaken to reform security and government institutions following crises, contributing to perceptions that perpetrators retained power and influence. Furthermore, coordination between the available mechanisms was insufficient due to their origin through executive decrees rather than dedicated legislation. No significant new transitional justice policies have emerged since the past attempts.
Transitional Justice Data
As of 2020, Cote d’Ivoire ranks 42nd out of 174 on TJET’s legacy of violence index. For a full list of country rankings over time, view the index page, and for an explanation of the index, view the Methods & FAQs page.
Amnesties
Cote d'Ivoire had five amnesties between 1992 and 2018. One was passed during ongoing internal armed conflict. One was passed after internal armed conflict. One was part of a peace agreement. Three amnesties released political prisoners. Two amnesties forgave human rights violations.
Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.
Domestic Trials
TJET has compiled data on 30 domestic prosecutions between 1973 and 2016. These include three transitional human rights prosecutions of state agents, in which five persons were convicted; 17 regular human rights prosecutions of state agents, in which 17 persons were convicted; twelve intrastate conflict prosecutions of state agents, in which eleven persons were convicted; and one opposition prosecution of state agents or opposition members, in which two persons were convicted. In three trials that involved high-ranking state agents, two persons were convicted.
Click on accused records for data on convictions. Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.
International or Hybrid Trials
Nationals of Cote d'Ivoire were subject to two international prosecutions between 2011 and 2012, which led to no convictions. Cote d'Ivoire was referred to the ICC in 2010. The ICC's Office of the Prosecutor opened a preliminary examination of the situation in Cote d'Ivoire in 2011. The first investigation of a specific case began in 2011. Starting in 2011, the ICC issued three arrest warrants, two of which resulted in court appearances. Proceedings began in two cases in 2016.
Click on accused records for data on convictions. Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.
Reparations Policies
Cote d'Ivoire mandated one reparations policy in 2015, which ended by 2017. According to available information, there was a total of 316954 individual beneficiaries.
Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.
Truth Commissions
Cote d'Ivoire mandated two truth commissions in 2000 and 2011. The commissions completed their operations in 2002 and 2014. One of the commissions issued a final report, which is publicly available. The report included recommendations for reparations and institutional reforms.
Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.
UN Investigations
Cote d'Ivoire was subject to five UN investigations between 2000 and 2011. Four investigations aimed to encourage domestic prosecutions.
Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.
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References
Amnesty International “Côte d’Ivoire: Arbitrary Arrests, Crackdown on Dissent and Torture Ahead of Presidential Election” (Amnesty International, February 11, 2019), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2019/02/cote-divoire-arbitrary-arrests-crackdown-on-dissent-and-torture/.
Comfort Ero “Ivory Coast on the Brink” (Crisis Group, December 15, 2002), https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/c%C3%B4te-divoire/ivory-coast-brink.
Gilbert Fokou and Yao Serge Alain N’Da “Social Cohesion in Post-Conflict Côte d’Ivoire: The Fragile Corner Stone of the Peacebuilding Process,” research report (Swisspeace, 2018), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17666.8.
Human Rights Watch “Simone Gbagbo Acquitted After Flawed War Crimes Trial” (Human Rights Watch, March 29, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/29/cote-divoire-simone-gbagbo-acquitted-after-flawed-war-crimes-trial.
Human Rights Watch “Côte d’Ivoire: UN Review Should Press Government on Justice” (Human Rights Watch, May 6, 2019), https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/05/06/cote-divoire-un-review-should-press-government-justice.
International Center for Transitional Justice “Disappointed Hope Judicial Handling of Post-Election Violence in Cote d’Ivoire,” research report (International Center for Transitional Justice; Koninklijke Brill NV, 2016), https://doi.org/10.1163/2210-7975_HRD-9808-2016007.
Abdul Rahman Lamin “The Conflict in Côte d’ivoire: South Africa’s Diplomacy, and Prospects for Peace,” research report (Institute for Global Dialogue, 2005), https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep07747.
Mark J Mullenbach “Cote d’Ivoire (1960-Present)” (University of Central Arkansas, 2019), https://uca.edu/politicalscience/home/research-projects/dadm-project/sub-saharan-africa-region/ivory-coast-1960-present/.
Daniel Samet “Reclaiming African Transitional Justice” (Atlantic Council, July 12, 2016), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/africasource/reclaiming-african-transitional-justice/.
UN Secretary-General “Role of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire: Special Report of the Secretary-General,” research report (United Nations Security Council, October 28, 2019), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_958.pdf.
US Department of State “2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cote d’Ivoire,” research report (US Department of State, 2022), https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cote-divoire/.
United States Institute of Peace “Commission of Inquiry: Côte d’Ivoire” (United States Institute of Peace, November 20, 2000), https://www.usip.org/publications/2000/11/commission-inquiry-cote-divoire.
Yuko Yokoi “ICTJ Experts Reflect on Côte d’Ivoire’s Transitional Justice Process and the Legacy of Their Work” (International Center for Transitional Justice, September 23, 2020), https://www.ictj.org/news/ictj-experts-reflect-c%C3%B4te-d%E2%80%99ivoire%E2%80%99s-transitional-justice-process-and-legacy-their-work.