Colombia

TJET Focus Country

This page presents a country report and describes data that TJET has compiled on regime transitions, intrastate conflict episodes, and transitional justice mechanisms. For details on the data included on this page, view the FAQ.

For Colombia, TJET has collected information on: 13 amnesties between 1981 and 2017; 168 domestic trials starting between 1980 and 2020; two reparations policies created between 2005 and 2011; and one truth commission mandated in 2017.

Select any transitional justice mechanism in the table below to view a timeline in the figure.

Author of country report: Daniel Marín-López

Introduction

The Colombian civil war stands as perhaps the most violent in Latin America, with over 10 million recorded victims over 60 years of internal armed conflict. This staggering figure means that one in every five Colombians has been declared a victim of serious human rights violations related to the armed conflict. Furthermore, according to the Truth Commission and the Human Rights Data Analysis Group, the estimated number of murders exceeds 800,000. These statistics underscore the Colombian case’s challenge to the assumption that democratic regimes lead to higher standards of peace.

Colombia has been a democracy since 1819, enjoying full rights and protections including universal suffrage, since 1957, with only a brief period of military rule between 1953 and 1957. Its uninterrupted series of elections earns it the distinction of being the oldest democracy in Latin America, despite the presence of protracted armed conflict.

Colombia also has a strong commitment to international law and international institutions. It has the highest number of ratifications of internationally recognized human rights treaties in Latin America. Its historical role in creating the Organization of American States (OAS) through the Bogotá Pact in 1948 is noteworthy. Additionally, Colombia has contributed to peacekeeping missions abroad, notably participating in the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai Peninsula to oversee the 1979 Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

In terms of governance, Colombia adopted a progressive constitution in 1991, encompassing a broad array of civil and economic rights, enforceable directly in the judicial system. The country maintains a robust system of checks and balances, ensuring significant institutional strength. However, state security forces have been implicated in severe atrocities, including the persecution of mostly left-wing political opponents. Since the 1980s, Colombia has pursued a “war on drugs” policy, leading to substantial military cooperation from the United States and exacerbating violence in cities and coca-producing regions.

Characterized as an intra-state conflict, Colombia’s armed struggle involves state forces combating guerrilla groups since the 1960s, alongside the continuous presence of organized paramilitary and para-state groups since at least 1980. This protracted conflict has become deeply entrenched in Colombian daily life after more than six decades of armed struggle.

Due to these circumstances, the state possesses extensive experience in peace negotiations, most recently evidenced by the signing of the Peace Agreement in 2016 between the government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the continent’s oldest guerrilla group. Additionally, Colombia has one of the most comprehensive transitional justice policies globally, employing a sustained application of internationally recognized principles including truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees of non-repetition.

Regime Context

TJET records no democratic transitions in Colombia between 1970 and 2020.

The Truth Commission has characterized the closing of democratic spaces as one of the root causes of the armed conflict in Colombia. Despite Colombia’s regular elections throughout the study period, particularly alternating between strong conservative-liberal bipartisanship until the 1990s, the exclusion of other left-wing political forces has been at the center of the insurgent-counterinsurgent violence that has characterized the internal armed conflict in the country.

Colombia has been a stable democracy since its independence, with only a brief period of military rule (1953-1957) and another of consociational democracy between the liberal and conservative parties during the period known as the National Front (1958-1974). However, in terms of political decision-making, the country has a legacy of abusive use of exceptional legislative powers granted to presidents mainly on grounds of national security. This feature means that while Colombia is recognized as a full democracy, its political history includes decades of presidential dominance. This anomaly in the Colombian political regime had consequences for the exercise of protest and the formation of alternative political forces to bipartisanship, who suffered torture and political persecution amidst the application of the National Security Doctrine inherited from Cold War strategies in the continent. In a recent decision, for example, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights declared the existence of a politically motivated genocide against the left-wing Patriotic Union party, where over 4,000 of its members were killed in the 1980s, including two presidential candidates.

With the enactment of the new Constitution in 1991, the country incorporated internationally recognized human rights into its legal framework and created institutional mechanisms for their enforceability by all citizens, including the establishment of an independent Ombudsman’s Office and an autonomous National Prosecutor’s Office separate from presidential power. Today, Colombia has independent and active courts that check executive power and expand the scope of civil and economic rights for vulnerable populations, including internally displaced persons, human rights defenders, and former combatants who are part of the 2016 Peace Agreement. However, because Colombia has struggled to consolidate peace, has frequently resorted to violent state repression, and has remained under the political influence of organized crime, the country is still not considered a full liberal democracy.

In 2022, Gustavo Petro, a former guerilla member, was elected the country’s first leftist president. The presidential elections were free and fair, but there were some noted irregularities in the March legislative elections, including fraud and vote-buying.

Conflict Context

Based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, TJET records 18 violent intrastate conflict episodes between 1970 and 2020 (during 50 calendar years), involving six distinct armed opposition groups fighting against the government.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions. Source: UCDP Dyadic Dataset version 23.1, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/index.html#dyadic.

Since the republican period of the 19th century to the present day, passing through the era of La Violencia in the mid-20th century, Colombia has been embroiled in numerous civil wars, marked by the signing of over 61 peace agreements with various armed actors. The contemporary Colombian armed conflict, often referred to as the period of social and political violence post-1957, denotes the cessation of the bipartisan armed conflict between conservatives and liberals known as La Violencia. Subsequent to this moment and the democratic restructuring of traditional political parties, at least four insurgent groups emerged (FARC, ELN, EPL and M-19), engaging in asymmetric warfare with the State.

Notably, in the 1980s, paramilitary factions were armed by landowners, military personnel, and public officials, aiming to assert territorial dominance, thus exacerbating human rights violations across urban and rural domains. By the 1990s, these paramilitary forces coalesced into a confederation known as the United Self-defense Groups of Colombia (AUC), extending their influence across the national territory. The AUC’s unified incursion challenged guerrilla control in specific regions, while their expansion into other territories marked a surge in heinous acts such as massacres. This period witnessed an alarming escalation in atrocity crimes during the late 1990s and early 2000s, constituting the peak years of violence within the internal armed conflict.

Characterized by over 200,000 homicides, 7 million forced displacements, and 32,446 instances of sexual violence, among other violations, the Colombian armed conflict stands as the most severe violent catastrophe in the Western Hemisphere during the 20th century. Both state and non-state actors employed violent tactics to secure territorial and social control, eradicate political adversaries, or undermine peace negotiations with rival factions.

Peace negotiations in the late 1980s led to the cessation of the M-19 and Popular Liberation Army (EPL) rebellions, laying the groundwork for a new Constitution in 1991. However, the FARC, National Liberation Army (ELN), and AUC persisted, with the latter experiencing resurgence in various regions. The year 2003 marked the bloodiest period in Colombian history, propelled by President Uribe’s aggressive policies in the early 2000s under the US-backed antiterrorist initiative “Plan Colombia”. Between 2003 and 2006, 31,671 paramilitaries were demobilized following an agreement with the government.

In 2017, 13,609 ex-combatants from the FARC demobilized pursuant to a Peace Agreement. This demobilization transpired subsequent to the rejection of the initial accord between the Government and the FARC, with the “NO” option prevailing by a slim one-percentage-point margin. This prompted a process of renegotiation and revision of the Agreement, which notably incorporated the input of opposition figures such as former President Alvaro Uribe. These developments have engendered pronounced polarization and cast doubt on the legitimacy of the agreed-upon terms. The Constitutional Court has cited this dynamic as a contributing factor to the targeting and persecution of signatories to the peace agreement; by 2023, the toll had surpassed 400 assassinations.

Since 2017, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has officially recognized the existence of armed conflict involving the ELN, the sole remaining guerrilla group in active insurgency, as well as emergent paramilitary factions and state forces. In 2021, urban protests were met with violent repression by police and security forces. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Final Agreement, human rights defenders have faced targeted assassinations, leading to Colombia being identified as one of the most perilous environments globally for defending rights, according to Witness. By 2023, Colombia has witnessed a resurgence of violence reminiscent of the late 2000s, with eight active conflicts involving the ELN, FARC dissidents, and paramilitary forces.

Transitional Justice

During the twentieth century, Colombia has had multiple policies of disarmament, amnesty, and penal treatment for former combatants of various guerrillas and paramilitary groups. Yet, the enduring nature of the armed conflict has spawned numerous transition policies over the past four decades, prompting consideration of a “transitional justice without transition” and contributing to its fragmented character. In the context of the 2016 peace agreement, Colombia has moved ahead on a wide range of policies for addressing state and non-state accountability for human rights violations. The system provides for human rights trials, a limited amnesty, a truth commission, and reparations. One unique facet of transitional justice in Colombia is that many of its recent policies and practices incorporate gender in their approach to accountability.

Transitional justice mechanisms were being used in Colombia before the 2016 peace agreement. At least since 2004, the language of transitional justice has been implemented in the country with a structural ruling by the Constitutional Court to recognize the rights of Internally Displaced People (IDPs). The Justice and Peace Law (Law 975, 2005) was enacted to demobilize paramilitary groups and hold them accountability for human rights violations. The Law created Special Chambers in District Tribunals that set alternative sanctions to perpetrators and provide reparations to victims. This process has been unique in that it incorporated the principles of truth, justice, and reparations within criminal proceedings. This placed a complex strain on the system due to the large number of victims requiring recognition for reparations and perpetrators needing adjudication. While the Justice and Peace process experienced a tumultuous start characterized by low levels of prosecutions, reforms to criminal prosecution in 2012 – including the incorporation of contextual and situational investigations akin to those of the ICC, as well as prioritization of cases involving the highest-ranking individuals – led to improvements.

Also in 2012, preceding peace negotiations with the FARC, transitional justice was incorporated through an amendment to the Constitution. This inclusion served two broad objectives: to expedite the prosecution process of paramilitaries and to lay the groundwork for the discussion of transitional justice in the negotiations between the Government and the FARC. As of May 2023, the Courts have rendered decisions in 98 cases involving paramilitaries. Early judicial decisions by Colombian courts recognized the disproportionate impact of violence on women and called on the state to prevent and redress them. Since 2011, for example, trials have also investigated paramilitary commanders for gender crimes. In 2014, these investigations were extended to the threats, persecution, torture, enforced disappearances, displacement, and killings that have targeted the LGBTQI+ population.

The main reparations program in Colombia predated the peace agreement and in fact ran parallel to the peace process, both preparing the ground for parts of the peace process and providing some evidence of the government’s commitment to its responsibility to victims as it engaged in peace negotiations. In 2011, the Colombian Congress passed the Victims Law (Law 1448, 2011), establishing a reparations program and special procedures for land restitution. The reparations program was also very much a response to community advocacy and litigation in Colombia by human rights and social justice organizations that had long called for remedies for the many collective injustices of the conflict. The Colombian reparations program is among the most ambitious in the world to date, in terms of its size and scope. First, it aims to serve a far broader and larger number of victims than any other reparations program in the TJET database, in both absolute terms and relative to population size. The program defined a broad set of beneficiaries including all possible injury types (e.g. physical, emotional, economic, and fundamental rights), and multiple kinds of victimizing acts including murder, threats, forced disappearances, sexual violence, and other grave harms.

The unit in charge of the Reparations program is Unit for Comprehensive Attention and Reparation of Victims, or Victims Unit (VU, Unidad para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las Víctimas). The Victims Unit moved quickly to create a National Registry for Victims (RUV), and that Registry grew dramatically over time. The policy also laid out a set of benefits to which victims were entitled, not just to repair tangible harms but to restore victims to full citizenship. Presidential Decrees and rulings of the Constitutional Court further refined these requirements. Although reparations were primarily intended for individuals, there is also a list of over 300 communities that are subjects for collective reparations, nearly half of which are Afro-Colombian groups or indigenous groups. Presently, the program proposes to offer reparations to over 15% of the population, encompassing 7,617,865 victims. The Colombia victims’ registry now includes more than 15% of the current population of Colombia; none of the other programs have registered or repaired more than 1% of their populations. The differences between the Colombia program and the other reparations programs are largely the result of the decision by the Colombian Constitutional Court to expand the original legislative mandate of the reparations program to include displaced people. The displaced population in 2016, at the time the Peace Agreement, was one of the highest in the world, followed closely only by Syria. If displaced people were not included in the Colombia program, the size of the registered victims would be approximately 2% of the population, still twice the size of other large reparations programs, but somewhat more in line with the other large and complete programs in the database.

Additionally, Colombia established a unit responsible for the restitution of land to displaced victims and civil judges tasked with applying a special procedure for restitution. As of March 2024, 246,780 hectares have been restituted in the country. However, limitations persist in its reach due to a high number of denials by the Unit regarding victims’ claims to land. This law also established an institution tasked with the memorialization of the armed conflict in the country and the construction of a museum dedicated to the conflict and its victims. The Colombian reparation and restitution policy was “gender attentive.” For example, the 2011 policy included gender violence as one of the harms for which victims could receive reparations. It also mandated “a special program to guarantee women’s access to the procedures envisaged for [land] restitution, through preferential service windows, personnel trained in gender issues, measures to facilitate access by women’s organizations or networks to reparation processes, as well as areas of care for children and adolescents and the disabled that make up their family group.” It also mandated that the unit responsible for land restitution process applications from female heads of household first.

The 2016 Peace Agreement between the state and FARC also included provisions for prosecutions of both members of the FARC and or State Agents, formed under pressure from victim’s groups and an extended International Criminal Court (ICC) preliminary examination. In 2002, Colombia ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC. In June 2004, the ICC Prosecutor opened a preliminary examination on Colombia after receiving communications of alleged atrocity crimes there. A preliminary examination is not a prosecution, so is not recorded in the TJET database, but it does bring the “shadow”of the Court to bear on domestic prosecutions. Because of the ICC doctrine of complementarity, the ICC cannot open an investigation as long as the government in a country is willing and able to hold genuine domestic human rights prosecutions. The ICC kept the preliminary examination of Colombia open for 17 years, but never moved to the next step of investigation.

The shadow of the ICC was important during the peace negotiations because the FARC initially refused to consider any form of criminal accountability. Given the open ICC preliminary examination, the Government was able to argue that there could not be peace without justice. Either the Colombian government could hold domestic prosecutions or they risked an international trial at the ICC. As a result of victim demands for justice and these ICC pressures, the Peace Agreements led to the establishment of a Restorative War Tribunal (Special Jurisdiction for Peace- JEP), which aims to carry out trials, pardons, and appeals procedures for members of FARC and State Agents.

In light of the work of the JEP, in 2021, the ICC Prosecutor announced his decision to close the preliminary examination in Colombia. The Prosecutor concluded that “national authorities of Colombia are neither inactive, unwilling nor unable to genuinely investigate and prosecute Rome Statute crimes.” By 2024, 11 macro cases have been initiated by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP), targeting the most serious human rights violations and selecting individuals to stand trial. By April 2024, the JEP has accredited 9,171 individuals and 334 collectives as victims. The JEP has also taken actions to address gender crimes and highlight the degree of violence that occurred against women and gender minorities during the armed conflict in the country. The JEP must still resolve the legal status of 14,094 individuals.

Since its inception, the JEP has issued three indictments involving only 30 individuals. In an April 2024 report by the UN human rights expert, Antonia Urrejola, limitations in granting amnesties to peace signatories were highlighted, along with concerns regarding the manner in which the JEP would issue its first restorative justice sentences.

The Colombian Truth Commission was established after the Peace Agreement, and it presented its Final Report on June 28th, 2022. This Commission has been the most extensively funded and staffed of any other commission to date. Its report has been recognized as an innovation in the field of truth-building in post-conflict settings. Particularly noteworthy are its strategies for digitizing archives, handling big data, and creating spaces to facilitate dialogue between victims and perpetrators. The final report contains the root causes of the conflict along with 67 recommendations for public policy to ensure non-repetition. The 2016 agreement also established a monitoring committee for the implementation of the recommendations, which issued its first report in August 2023. The report highlights limited financial capacity and lack of political will to implement TC recommendations.

Colombia’s TC was one of the most gender-attentive in the TJET database. Its staff consulted with women and gender minority victims to understand their perspectives and needs prior to issuing its report. Its Final Report included a chapter titled “My Body is the Truth,” providing a comprehensive analysis of violence against women and the LGBTQI+ population, one of the most extensive reviews of its kind to be conducted by a TC. The report’s power is not only in its recognition of sexual violence as a weapon of war employed by state and non-state actors, but also in its acknowledgment of the instrumental use of other human rights violations, such as forced displacement and torture, to gain political and territorial control. Sexual violence, the report highlights, is a systemic and widespread violation specifically targeting individuals based on their gender identity. The Commission further recognized that the patriarchal nature of violence in Colombia was one of the underlying causes of the armed conflict. Finally, the Colombian Truth Commission was the only TC that addressed sexual violence, gender discrimination, and protection of the LGBTQI+ population in its recommendations.

Transitional Justice Data

As of 2020, Colombia ranks 32nd out of 174 on TJET’s legacy of violence index. For a full list of country rankings over time, view the index page, and for an explanation of the index, view the Methods & FAQs page.

Amnesties

Colombia had 13 amnesties between 1981 and 2017. Seven were passed during ongoing internal armed conflict. Five were passed after internal armed conflict. Four were part of a peace agreement. One amnesty released political prisoners. Three amnesties forgave human rights violations.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

Domestic Trials

TJET has compiled data on 168 domestic prosecutions between 1980 and 2020. These include 33 regular human rights prosecutions of state agents, in which 42 persons were convicted; 119 intrastate conflict prosecutions of state agents, in which 242 persons were convicted; and 17 intrastate conflict prosecutions of opposition members, in which 18 persons were convicted. In 21 trials that involved high-ranking state agents, eleven persons were convicted.

Click on accused records for data on convictions. Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

Reparations Policies

Colombia implemented two reparations policies, starting in 2006. According to available information, there was a total of 9763826 individual beneficiaries. Two reparations policies provided collective benefits.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

Truth Commissions

Colombia mandated one truth commission in 2017. The commission completed its operations in 2022. The commission issued a final report, which is publicly available. The report included recommendations for prosecutions, reparations, and institutional reforms.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

UN Investigations

Colombia was subject to one UN investigation in 2002.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

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References

Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes, María Paula Saffon Sanín, Catalina Botero Marino, and Esteban Restrepo Saldarriaga “¿Justicia Transicional Sin Transición?: Verdad, Justicia y Reparación Para Colombia,” Dejustica, 2006, https://www.jep.gov.co/Sala-de-Prensa/Documents/Justicia%20transicional%20sin%20transici%C3%B3n.pdf.

Fernán E. González González Poder y Violencia En Colombia (Editorial Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 2014).

César A. Rodríguez Garavito Radical Deprivation on Trial: The Impact of Judicial Activism on Socioeconomic Rights in the Global South, Comparative Constitutional Law and Policy (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

Ana Arjona Rebelocracy: Social Order in the Colombian Civil War (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

Nina Chaparro and Margarita Martínez Negociando Desde Los Márgenes: La Participación Política de Las Mujeres En Los Procesos de Paz de Colombia (1982-2016) (Bogotá: Dejusticia, 2016), https://www.digitaliapublishing.com/a/130759/negociando-desde-los-margenes.

PA-X, ed. “Final Agreement to End the Armed Conflict and Build a Stable and Lasting Peace” (The University of Edinburgh Peace Agreements Database, 2016), https://www.peaceagreements.org/wview/1845/Final%20Agreement%20to%20End%20the%20Armed%20Conflict%20and%20Build%20a%20Stable%20and%20Lasting%20Peace.

Juan Pablo Vera “The Humanitarian State: Bureaucracy and Social Policy in Colombia” (PhD thesis, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, 2017), https://doi.org/10.7282/T3JQ13X1.

Onur Bakiner “The Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition: Precedents and Prospects,” in As War Ends: What Colombia Can Tell Us About the Sustainability of Peace and Transitional Justice, ed. Jacqueline H. R. DeMeritt, James Meernik, and Mauricio Uribe-López (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 230–48, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108614856.011.

Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín Clientelistic Warfare: Paramilitaries and the State in Colombia (1982-2007), Sociología Política Para Los Desafíos Del Siglo XXI 2 (Oxford ; New York: Peter Lang, 2019).

Sandra Botero “Trust in Colombia’s Justicia Especial Para La Paz: Experimental Evidence,” Journal of Politics in Latin America 12, no. 3 (December 1, 2020): 300–322, https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X20959509.

Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court “ICC Prosecutor, Mr Karim A. A. Khan QC, Concludes the Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Colombia with a Cooperation Agreement with the Government Charting the Next Stage in Support of Domestic Efforts to Advance Transitional Justice” (Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, October 28, 2021), https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/icc-prosecutor-mr-karim-khan-qc-concludes-preliminary-examination-situation-colombia.

Kathryn Sikkink, Douglas A. Johnson, Phuong N. Pham, and Patrick Vinck “A Critical Assessment of Colombia’s Reparations Policies in the Context of the Peace Process,” in Time for Reparations: A Global Perspective, ed. Jacqueline Bhabha, Margareta Matache, and Caroline Elkins (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2021), 119–36, https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1f45q96.12.

Instituto Colombo-Alemán para la Paz “An Executive Summary of the Truth Commission’s Final Report” (CAPAZ: Instituto Colombo-Alemán para la Paz, 2023), https://www.instituto-capaz.org/en/an-executive-summary-of-the-truth-commissions-final-report/.

Alejandro Castillejo-Cuéllar “A Listening Device: Colombia’s Truth Commission and the Politics of the Audible,” Journal of Human Rights Practice 15, no. 3 (November 1, 2023): 763–72, https://doi.org/10.1093/jhuman/huad046.

Nelson Camilo Sánchez and Karolina Naranjo Velasco “Institutional Design and Transitional Justice: An Analysis of Colombia’s Land Restitution Policy,” Revista Derecho Del Estado, no. 57, 57 (August 30, 2023): 225–58, https://doi.org/10.18601/01229893.n57.09.

Kyle Johnson, Ángela Gómez, Ángela Aguirre, and Daniel Albarracín “Disidencias de Las FARC-EP: Dos Caminos de Una Guerra En Construcción,” research report (Fundación CORE, March 1, 2024), https://www.conflictresponses.org/disidencias-de-las-farc-ep-dos-caminos-de-una-guerra-en-construccion-partes-1-y-2/.

A. Ricardo López-Pedreros and Lina Britto Histories of Perplexity: Colombia, 1970s-2010s (Routledge, 2024), https://www.routledge.com/Histories-of-Perplexity-Colombia-1970s-2010s/Lopez-Pedreros-Britto/p/book/9780367499365.