Myanmar

TJET Focus Country

This page presents a country report and describes data that TJET has compiled on regime transitions, intrastate conflict episodes, and transitional justice mechanisms. For details on the data included on this page, view the FAQ.

For Myanmar, TJET has collected information on: ten amnesties between 1980 and 2013; 14 domestic trials starting between 1976 and 2020; one foreign trial starting in 2019; and two truth commissions mandated between 2016 and 2018.

Select any transitional justice mechanism in the table below to view a timeline in the figure.

Conflict Year

Democratic Transition Year

Author of country report: Helen Clapp & Sri Lestari Wahyuningroem

Introduction

Myanmar is a state in Southeast Asia that borders Bangladesh, China, India, Laos, and Thailand. The country has experienced numerous coups d’etat and has one of the longest records of military rule of any state. Myanmar was a British colony from 1826-1942. Japan occupied Myanmar in 1942 during World War II. When Japan lost the war, Britain regained control and in 1947 signed the Panglong agreement that contained a guarantee of independence within the next year. Myanmar gained independence from Britain on January 4, 1948. In 1989, the military changed the country’s name from the Union of Burma to the Union of Myanmar, as part of a larger process of vernacularization that replaced all names used by the British for cities and ethnic groups. In 2006, Myanmar moved its capital from Yangon to Nay Pyi Taw.

The population of Myanmar is around 57 million. Approximately 68% of the population belongs to the Bamar ethnic group, who speak Burmese. They mostly reside in the central part of the country, while the other major ethnic groups inhabit the periphery. There are 135 recognized “national races,” though the most significant minority ethnic groups are the Shan, Karen, Rakhine, Mon, Kachin, Kayah, and Chin. Nearly 88% of the country is Buddhist, 6% is Christian, and 4% is Buddhist. The most notable Muslim group are the Rohingya, who mostly live in Rakhine state. Crucially, the Rohingya are not officially recognized as a “national race” by the state.

Prior to British colonization, ethnicity was not a central political concern. But the British introduced the concept of race, and in the process, intentionally empowered ethnic minorities over the Bamar majority. And while the colonials instituted direct rule in the lowlands, which was home to the Barma, they engaged in indirect rule in the upland regions, affording groups like the Kachin and Shan a great deal of autonomy. Burmese nationalism arose in response to this policy of favoritism toward minorities, and that is why nationalist forces are still very much constituted by Bamar culture today.

Following independence in 1948, the government under Prime Minister U Nu failed to produce a multi-ethnic federation, and the state and armed forces quickly came under the control of Barma elites. The government faced immediate challenges from the Communist Party of Burma and the Karen insurrection. The late 1950s and early 1960s brought a renewed period of civil war. In 1961, U Nu made Buddhism the official religion of Burma through legislation, which aggravated the Kachin and Chin, who are Christian. These groups took up arms against the military, as the Shan had in 1959 in response to military mobilization against Chinese nationalist forces. In response to these mounting threats, General Ne Win launched a 1962 coup d’etat, replacing civilian with military rule. This would only fan the flames of conflict, leading to decades of violent, ethnicized challenges to the central government.

Regime Context

Based on well-known democracy data, TJET records one democratic transition starting in 2015.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

Myanmar has experienced a series of ethnic conflicts since it gained independence. It is also an example of how militarism can persist for long periods and dominate political life. From 1962 to the present, the country has been mostly under the rule of successive authoritarian governments. The military, known as the Tatmadaw in Burmese, staged its first coup in 1962, implemented isolationist policies, and used repression against various elements of society. The Tatmadaw tortured political dissidents, journalists, human rights activists and anyone suspected of criticizing the state, particularly between 1988 and 2007. Western governments began to campaign against the Myanmar military’s totalitarian rule and denial of rights only in the 1990s. The Myanmar government first attracted international attention and criticism for its use of force against demonstrators in 1988 and its refusal to recognise the results of the 1990 general election, in which Aung San Suu Kyi’s political party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won a landslide victory. The military did not cede power to Suu Kyi, which some attribute to generals’ worry that they would be put on trial under a new democratic regime. Since these events, the government has continued to violate human rights, leading to international criticism of Myanmar’s successive juntas.

In 2008, the ruling State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) held a referendum to approve a new constitution, produced from a process that it tightly controlled. Article 445 grants blanket immunity to current and past iterations of the military and military-led governments. Constitutional reform is virtually impossible, due to provisions that require changes to be approved by 75% of legislators, although the military also appointed 25% of the members of every chamber. The new constitution did little to dislodge, and in fact entrenched, the military’s controlling position in national politics. Elections in 2010 brought in Myanmar’s first civilian government since 1962. However, the NLD boycotted the election, and the new government was led by recently retired military officers, including President Thein Sein.

Thein Sein’s government initiated a number of limited reforms, including easing restrictions on the press and public protests. It released an estimated 2,000 political prisoners and allowed many political exiles to return. Myanmar became less isolated under Thein Sein and saw a flood of international aid and investments. The government also undertook a comprehensive peace process with ethnic armed groups. Thein Sein brokered bilateral ceasefires with almost all of the 18 or so major ethnic armed groups, after which the process moved to a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement, eventually signed in 2015 by eight of the 15 groups invited to participate. However, many issues – including accountability for allegations of human rights abuses and an eventual political transition – were not open for negotiation.

In 2015, Myanmar underwent another step in democratic transition, marked by alternation in power from the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) to the pro-democracy NLD. The 2008 constitution barred Aung San Suu Kyi from becoming President, due to her late British husband and sons, but the party created an extra-constitutional position of State Counselor, above the President. Her new government inherited deep-rooted challenges, including the constitutional empowerment of the military, repressive legislation, weak rule of law, and a corrupt judiciary. At the same time, the military continued to commit human rights abuses with impunity. In Kachin and Shan States, violence against many ethnic groups carried on, with many suffering from food shortages as the military blocked aid. Still, the situation that attracted the most international attention was the large-scale systematic campaign against the Rohingya.

In the 2020 election, the NLD won another overwhelming majority, with 396 out of 476 seats. The USDP won only 33 seats in Union-level parliaments. The military disputed the results, repeatedly claiming without evidence that the voter lists were flawed and that there had been electoral fraud. Myanmar’s emergent democracy gave military leader Sr Gen Min Aung Hlaing and his authoritarian supporters pause: the military was losing power under democratic reforms, even though the political system was heavily rigged in its favour. This threatened the system of military-economic monopoly that had enriched generals and their cronies for generations. Within three months of the election, the Tatmadaw escalated its accusations against the NLD government, culminating in a coup on February 1, 2021 and the installation of a military junta.

The junta brought multiple charges against Aung San Suu Kyi, for corruption, incitement, and breaching the Official Secrets Act. In September 2021, three of her deposed cabinet ministers—Soe Win, Sett Aung and Kyaw Win—as well as Australian economic adviser Sean Turnell were convicted under the Official Secrets Act. Each was sentenced to three years in prison. Earlier that month, Aung San Suu Kyi and former President Win Myint were also sentenced to three years and hard labor under electoral fraud charges. Suu Kyi was convicted of yet more charges in December, bringing her total sentence to 33 years. The junta also arbitrarily arrested more than 16,000 pro-democracy supporters, including former United Kingdom ambassador to Myanmar Vicky Bowman, Japanese filmmaker Toru Kubota, and American botanist Kyaw Htay Oo. In July 2022, the government executed former opposition lawmaker Phyo Zeya Thaw, prominent activist Kyaw Min Yu (known as “Ko Jimmy”), Hla Myo Aung, and Aung Thura Zaw, all of whom were convicted after closed trials that fell far short of international standards.

The 2021 coup led to the resumption of the country’s devastating civil war, with the military arresting more than 20,000 anti-coup protesters, killing more than 3,000 people, and burning 55,000 houses and buildings. The coup effectively abrogated the 2008 constitution, despite the junta’s reiteration of a “constitutional justification for the state of emergency.” To suppress the anti-coup movement, the junta armed itself with repressive new laws, systematically dismantling the basic protections of freedom of expression, assembly, association, and privacy.

Conflict Context

Based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, TJET records 54 violent intrastate conflict episodes between 1970 and 2020, involving 31 distinct armed opposition groups fighting against the government.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions. Source: UCDP Dyadic Dataset version 23.1, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/index.html#dyadic.

In Myanmar, ethnicity has become a central issue in the context of citizenship, fundamental rights, politics and armed conflict, though violence and conflict in Myanmar escalated with the strengthening of the military junta regime. The state recognizes 135 different ethnic groups. This figure is usually quoted without qualification, but is based on unverified lists compiled by amateur colonial linguists and physiognomists nearly 100 years ago. This classification system is overly complicated and essentially useless today. Attempts at ethnic categorization and enumeration were made from the British colonial era to the most recent census in 2014. A year before Burma gained independence from Britain in 1948, a conference of leaders from the Burman, Kachin, Shan and Chin ethnic groups produced the Panglong Agreement, which stipulated that the Federal Union of Burma would promote ethnic equality. However, minorities complained about a lack of autonomy and about the state’s failure to live up to its promises of equality and autonomy for ethnic minorities and tolerance of religions other than Buddhism.

In the years after independence, fighting broke out between government troops and armed entities linked to various ethnic groups demanding self-determination and equality. There are currently about 25 major ethnic armed groups active in Myanmar, and many of these have corresponding political wings. There are also hundreds of smaller armed militias that range in size and firepower some of which are also formed along ethnic lines. Until the 2021 coup produced opposition People’s Defense Forces (PDFs), most of these smaller groups were aligned with the Tatmadaw and supposedly under its control, though the degree of control varies. In addition, there are 23 Border Guard Forces composed mainly of ex-militia members that have been brought more formally under the control of the Tatmadaw. These varying degrees of opposition to, alignment with, and control by the Tatmadaw create complicated conflict dynamics. Since the 2021 coup, the ongoing conflict has escalated substantially.

The denial of full and meaningful citizenship to ethnic minorities in Myanmar is one of the main factors perpetuating the conflict. Myanmar’s citizenship regime is arguably one of the most racialized in the world. The 1948 constitution emphasized membership in any of the “indigenous races” of Myanmar as an important criteria for citizenship. It also allowed some long-term residents from other parts of the British Empire to become citizens. However, many of these residents left during the Second World War or after independence. Many more were expelled by the military government in the 1960s. The 1948 Citizenship Act stipulated that to be considered indigenous, a group needed to have established a permanent home in Myanmar before 1823 (the year before the first Anglo-Burmese War started). There was no list in law or regulation of which groups were considered indigenous, although the concept of ‘indigenous races’ had become politically central to the national narrative of who belonged. State authorities often referred to the major groups that had their own states, along with unspecified ‘others.’ Myanmar’s 1982 Act grants citizenship to Taingyintha or ‘ethnic nationalities’; all others must apply based on family genealogy and provide documents supporting their claims.

This raises the question of the recognition of indigenous peoples as citizens of the country. One such group is the Rohingya. They have lived in Rakhine State, also known as Arakan, on the westernmost coast of Myanmar, on the border with Bangladesh, since the early 4th century. Their cultural identity is influenced by Islam and they are considered one of Myanmar’s ethnic minorities. After Myanmar gained its independence, the Rohingya were allowed to live and work in Myanmar in the same way as the rest of the population. The first Prime Minister of Myanmar under the 1948 constitution, U Nu, introduced a democratic system of governance called ‘91 Taa-Na’ in which 132 members from various communal backgrounds were elected to Myanmar’s governing body. These included Rohingya representatives Ghani Markan and U Abdul Ghaffar as MPs from Buthidaung and Maungdaw constituencies. Myanmar also became a state party to the Genocide Convention of 1948 in 1956, thus demonstrating its support for human rights.

The situation changed dramatically after the coup led by General Ne Win in 1962, when the military regime committed a series of acts of escalating violence against the Rohingya in Rakhine. The junta’s first act of genocide began when the government introduced the Emergency Immigration Act of 1974, which aimed to limit “foreigners” entering the country. All citizens were required to carry national registration certificates, while the government began confiscating the Rohingya’s national identity cards. The Rohingya were only offered Foreign Registration Cards (FRCs), which many of them refused to accept as they were born in Myanmar and were already considered to be citizens of Myanmar under the Union Citizenship Act of 1948. While the majority of the Rohingya live without documentation, the junta began to expel them through crackdowns involving mass arrests, persecution and killings in order to drive them from their land.

Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law was subsequently invoked as a legal basis for expelling the Rohingya. Under the law, Myanmar grants citizenship only to 135 recognised ‘national races.’ A number of ethnic groups, including the Rohingya, Karen, Shan and others, are excluded from the list. The government continues to use the 1982 Citizenship Law as a tool to legitimize discrimination against Rohingyas in Myanmar by denying them the right to citizenship. Between 1991 and 1992, the military launched Operation Pyi Thaya, or ‘Clean and Beautiful Nation.’ To counter anti-military and pro-democracy campaigns, it created a special border force called NaSaKa. It consisted of police, military, customs and immigration officers to control and repress the remaining Rohingya in Rakhine. During this period, NaSaKa’s arbitrary violence in Rakhine included murder, rape, and destruction of Rohingya villages and mosques, as well as forcible taxation and confiscation of land given to Rakhine and Burmese brought in by the military from other regions. As a result of two clearance operations between 1970 and 1990, over 300,000 Rohingya in Rakhine were forced to flee. The number of deaths remains undocumented. Since then, a mass exodus of Rohingya became a fait accompli. They have sought refuge in neighbouring countries including Bangladesh, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia.

Violence against Rohingya Muslims in Rakhine is not only perpetrated by the military regime but also by community groups, in this case the Rakhine Buddhist majority in Rakhine State and also ethnic Burmans. In 2012, deadly intercommunal clashes broke out in Rakhine State. Anti-Muslim violence has spread to other parts of Myanmar. The security forces did little to combat the deep anti-Muslim sentiment in the country, leading to further clashes and mass violence. This violence demonstrated horizontal inequalities at two levels, firstly between ethnic Rohingya and Rakhines in Rakhine state, and secondly between ethnic Rakhines and ethnic Burmans at the national level. The importance of the government’s response to rising tensions is clear. The pattern of violence, and in particular the role of politicians and local networks in fuelling the conflict, parallels other examples of ethnic conflict in the region and more widely.

In October 2016, hundreds of Rohingya men affiliated with the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) attacked three border police posts in the northern part of Myanmar’s Rakhine State. They killed nine police officers and seized a cache of weapons and ammunition. The Myanmar police and military responded to the attack with heavy-handed tactics. Soldiers and police indiscriminately shot and killed civilians, raped women and girls, torched entire villages, and arbitrary arrested Rohingya men without any information about their whereabouts. These actions constitute a form of collective punishment against the Rohingya in the northern part of Rakhine State and may amount to crimes against humanity. By 2017, up to 700,000 Rohingyas had fled the country, making it one of the largest exoduses of people in the world.

Transitional Justice

Following the start of liberalization in Myanmar, marked by quasi-democratic reforms in 2011, many in the international community predicted that the country would abandon its authoritarianism and begin a political transition. Some were hopeful that a transitional justice agenda for restoring state accountability and public trust could develop. However, during this early period of transition and peace negotiation, a frank national dialogue concerning the massive human rights violations in the country was largely off the table, and they remain off the table today. All mechanisms with some semblance to transitional justice in Myanmar are little more than instruments of military hegemony.

In late 2012, President Thein Sein appointed a 27-member Commission of Inquiry on Sectarian Violence in Rakhine State to “uncover the truth behind the unrest” and “find solutions for people with different religious beliefs to coexist harmoniously.” This inquiry possesses the formal trappings of a truth commission, given that its stated purpose was to examine a period of sectarian violence between Rakhines and Rohingya during a defined period of time (June to October 2012). However, the commission did not shine light on the government’s own role in the conflict, which targeted Rohingya. Moreover, no Rohingya representatives were on the Commission, and its participants used the term “Bengali” to refer to the Rohingya community. The final report, released in July 2013, includes an explanation of why the term Rohingya is not acceptable, and why there should be an enhanced military presence in the state. In some ways, the final report of this commission, rather than representing a culmination of impartial truth-finding procedures, lays bare the intentions of a military that only three years later would initiate a much wider campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Rohingya people.

Aung San Suu Kyi assumed the office of the State Counselor following 2015 elections. She urged the country to focus on the future rather than the past. Understanding that the Tatmadaw would derail the democratic transition before allowing criminal accountability to move forward, Suu Kyi repeatedly floated the possibility of a South African style truth and reconciliation commission for Myanmar. However, a full-fledged TRC would never materialize. The Myanmar government instead pursued a series of limited and problematic commissions of inquiry.

In September 2016, Suu Kyi established the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, and requested the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan helm the proceedings. This hybrid entity, which had two other international members and six domestic members, was the closest thing Myanmar had to a legitimate truth commission. While Annan ensured that the Advisory Commission made a good-faith effort to address persistent underdevelopment and violence in Rakhine State, its work would be overshadowed by the unfolding humanitarian crisis that erupted as it conducted its work.

One month into the Advisory Commission’s work, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA), a group that formed in response to the sectarian fighting in 2012, attacked border police posts in Maungdaw, located in the north of Rakhine State. The military responded to the October 9 events with overwhelming violence, escalating the conflict with the Muslim insurgents. In the three months following the initial attacks, ARSA began to consolidate its foothold in Rohingya villages, while the military conducted what it called “clearing operations.” The counter-insurgency tactics used in these operations – including burning villages, mass rape and sexual violence, enforced disappearances, and the shooting of women and children as they fled toward the border with Bangladesh – likely amounted to crimes against humanity, according to a UN Office of the High Commissioner report that was published on February 3, 2017.

This “flash report” on the escalating situation in Rakhine State drew close attention from the Myanmar government. On December 26, 2016, a sub-national parliamentary commission in Rakhine had published a report sounding alarms about heightened security in Buddhist areas. This commission lacked Rohingya representation, and it did not investigate any human rights violations. And shortly before that, on December 1, 2016, the national government formed a 13-member Investigation Commission on Maungdaw in Rakhine State, chaired by Vice President Myint Swe. This commission was mandated to release a final report by January 31, 2017, but on that date it only offered a statement saying it would wait on the OHCHR report to be released, making clear the commission’s intentions to respond directly to the UN investigation. On August 6, 2017, the Government of Myanmar’s Investigation Commission released a report arguing that “no possible evidence” suggested “any crime against humanity or any act of ethnic cleansing in support of allegations made by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR).”

TJET does not find that the 2016 subnational parliamentary commission or the 2016 Investigative Commission fit the definition of a truth commission, because they were not mandated to conduct investigations into human rights violations over a period of time. TJET also holds that neither two military investigations in 2017 headed by Lt. Gen. Aye Win, nor a 2017 police investigation under the Ministry of Home Affairs, count as truth commissions. These were internal teams that did not constitute standalone truth-seeking bodies, and they allegedly fabricated much of their investigations. They also fully absolved the government of all wrongdoing, save for one incident of petty theft and another the involved simple assault on a small group of villagers.

In March 2017, the United Nations Human Rights Council authorized a three-member Fact Finding Mission to Myanmar to investigate the mass violence called the International Independent Fact-Finding Mission to Myanmar (IIFFMM). The IIFFMM aimed at establishing the facts and circumstances related to alleged human rights violations committed by the security forces and military in Myanmar. It was formed in response to the February 2017 report issued by the OHCHR.

It was in the wake of these five government inquests, and the newly operational Human Rights Council investigation, in August 2017, that the Kofi Annan-led Advisory Commission released its report. The report right away addresses conflict over the what to call the Rohingya people, noting that it used “Muslim” rather than “Bengali” or “Rohingya” to identify them, in line with a request from Aung San Suu Kyi. After providing a historical overview of the anti-central government and inter-communal tensions in Rakhine State, the final report listed the Advisory Commission’s main findings and 88 recommendations in a number of areas. Notably, the Advisory Commission did not directly advocate for granting citizenship to the Rohingya, but did recommend that the Myanmar government should “set in motion a process to review the law,” which should “re-examine the current linkage between citizenship and ethnicity.” The Commission attracted criticism because once again there were no Rohingya included on the panel of six members from Myanmar and three foreign members, though it did conduct over 100 meetings, some with representatives from the community. Another criticism was that the mandate of the Advisory Commission was development-oriented, rather than oriented toward redress for human rights violations.

Nevertheless, at the end of 2017, the Government of Myanmar announced that it would establish an Advisory Board for the Committee for Implementation of the Recommendations on Rakhine State, yet another a truth-commission-like entity that fails to meet the definition of an actual transitional justice mechanism. While the body had commissioners, including Thai diplomat Surakiart Sathirathai, it was not mandated to actually perform any investigations, only to make further recommendations on the basis of the Annan Report. An American member of the Committee, Bill Richardson, quit in January 2018, calling its work a “whitewash.” The Advisory Board submitted a report to the government in August 2018.

One month later, on September 18, 2018, the Human Rights Council-mandated IIFFMM issued its own 440-page report (A/HRC/39/64) calling for “an independent and impartial mechanism to collect, consolidate, preserve and analyse evidence of violations.” It also recommended targeted individual sanctions against those found to be most responsible for violations, suggesting the situation in Myanmar be referred to the International Criminal Court or for an ad hoc international criminal tribunal to be established, and for Myanmar’s top military generals to be investigated and prosecuted for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity in Rakhine.

In the months leading up to the IIFFMM’s report, Suu Kyi announced that the government would establish a truth commission with one “international personality.” On August 29, 2018, a presidential spokesperson stated that an Independent Commission of Enquiry (ICOE) was formed to “respond to false allegations made by the UN Agencies and other international communities.” The commissioners were announced to be Philippine ambassador Rosario Manalo, Japanese diplomat Kenzo Oshimo, and two Myanmar officials, Col. Aung Tun Thet and Mya Thein. This temporary body qualifies as a truth commission given its stated purpose was to “investigate the attacked that occurred on 25 August 2017 and thereafter, and the consequences of those attacks that led to the mass displacement of people, with a view to seeking accountability and formulating recommendations on steps to be taken to ensure sustainable peace and development in Rakhine State.” However, it is not a robust truth commission because its mandated powers, its methods of investigation, its level of engagement with survivors, and its final outputs all remain shrouded in mystery. On January 21, 2020, the Office of the President released an executive summary that centers ARSA in its account of mass killing, while also arguing that casualty figures contain inconsistencies. However, the report does acknowledge that government forces may have engaged in property destruction, looting, and forced displacement, though it flatly denies that government forces engaged in rape.

Finally, TJET does record around 14 prosecutions of state agents for conflict and human rights crimes that have occurred since 2015. However, as noted by Asia Justice and Rights (AJAR), most of these cases are tried in military courts, which do not look favourably upon international standards of accountability. Many of the accused are acquitted, or given very light sentences upon conviction.

With the 2021 coup, and the resumption of widescale intrastate conflict, any consideration of a state-level transitional justice agenda has evaporated. However, civil society in Myanmar remains active in the pursuit of justice for human rights violations. Unofficial truth-telling events, documentation projects, and advocacy for reparations have been organised by organisations such as the All-Burma Students’ Democratic Front are dedicated to assisting victims and documenting human rights violations.

Transitional Justice Data

As of 2020, Myanmar ranks 3rd out of 174 on TJET’s legacy of violence index. For a full list of country rankings over time, view the index page, and for an explanation of the index, view the Methods & FAQs page.

Amnesties

Myanmar had ten amnesties between 1980 and 2013. One was passed during ongoing internal armed conflict. Three were passed after internal armed conflict. Eight amnesties released political prisoners. One amnesty forgave human rights violations.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

Domestic Trials

TJET has compiled data on 14 domestic prosecutions between 1976 and 2020. These include three transitional human rights prosecutions of state agents, in which one person was convicted; four regular human rights prosecutions of state agents, in which seven persons were convicted; four intrastate conflict prosecutions of state agents, in which two persons were convicted; one intrastate conflict prosecution of opposition members, in which two persons were convicted; and three opposition prosecutions of state agents or opposition members, in which four persons were convicted.

Click on accused records for data on convictions. Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

Foreign Trials

Nationals of Myanmar were defendants in one foreign prosecution in Argentina beginning in 2019.

Click on accused records for data on convictions. Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

Truth Commissions

Myanmar mandated two truth commissions in 2016 and 2018. The commissions completed their operations in 2017 and 2020. The commissions issued final reports, one of which is publicly available. The reports included recommendations for prosecutions, reparations, and institutional reforms.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

UN Investigations

Myanmar was subject to three UN investigations between 2017 and 2023. Two investigations aimed to encourage domestic prosecutions. Two investigations aimed to support international prosecutions.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

Download Country Data

References

Advisory Commission on Rakhine State “Towards a Peaceful, Fair and Prosperous Future for the People of Rakhine: Final Report of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State,” research report (Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, August 2017), https://www.kofiannanfoundation.org/app/uploads/2017/08/FinalReport_Eng.pdf.

Amnesty International “Myanmar: Security Forces Target Rohingya During Vicious Rakhine Scorched-Earth Campaign” (Amnesty International, December 19, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2016/12/myanmar-security-forces-target-rohingya-viscious-scorched-earth-campaign/.

AJAR and ND Burma “Transitional Justice: Myanmar Case Study,” research report (Asia Justice; Rights (AJAR); Transitional Justice Asia Network; ND Burma, October 2017), https://asia-ajar.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/English-Myanmar-Case-Study.pdf.

Harrison Akins “The Two Faces of Democratization in Myanmar: A Case Study of the Rohingya and Burmese Nationalism,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 38, no. 2 (2018): 229–45, https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2018.1475619.

A. Anwary “Atrocities Against the Rohingya Community of Myanmar,” Indian Journal of Asian Affairs 31, no. 1/2 (2018): 91–102.

Jacques Bertrand, Alexandre Pelletier, and Ardeth Maung Thawnghmung Cornell University Press Winning by Process: The State and Neutralization of Ethnic Minorities in Myanmar (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2022).

Adam Burke “New Political Space, Old Tensions: History, Identity and Violence in Rakhine State, Myanmar,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 38, no. 2 (2016): 258–83, https://muse.jhu.edu/pub/70/article/628459.

Nick Cheesman “How in Myanmar ‘National Races’ Came to Surpass Citizenship and Exclude Rohingya,” Journal of Contemporary Asia 47, no. 3 (May 27, 2017): 461–83, https://doi.org/10.1080/00472336.2017.1297476.

Alexander Dukalskis “Transitional Justice in Burma/Myanmar: Crossnational Patterns and Domestic Context,” Irish Studies in International Affairs 26 (2015): 83–97, https://doi.org/10.3318/isia.2015.26.9.

Antonio Graceffo “Backgrounder: Ethnic Armies in the Myanmar Civil War” (Geopolitical Monitor, February 27, 2024), https://www.geopoliticalmonitor.com/backgrounder-ethnic-armies-in-the-myanmar-civil-war/.

Md. Mahbubul Haque “Rohingya Ethnic Muslim Minority and the 1982 Citizenship Law in Burma,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 37, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 454–69, https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2017.1399600.

Ye Myo Hein “The Root Causes of Myanmar’s Coup Go Deeper,” research report (Wilson Center, March 2022), https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/2022-03-Myanmar_YeMyoHein.pdf.

Ian Holliday “Thinking about Transitional Justice in Myanmar,” South East Asia Research 22, no. 2 (June 1, 2014): 183–200, https://doi.org/10.5367/sear.2014.0204.

Shatti Hoque “Myanmar’s Democratic Transition: Opportunity for Transitional Justice to Address the Persecution of the Rohingya,” Emory International Law Review 32, no. 4 (January 1, 2018): 551, https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol32/iss4/3.

A N M Zakir Hossain “Sustainable Development and Livelihoods of Rohingya Refugees in Bangladesh: The Effects of COVID-19,” International Journal of Sustainable Development and Planning 16, no. 6 (October 2021): 1141–52.

Human Rights Watch “Q&A: United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar” (Human Rights Watch, August 2, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/02/qa-united-nations-fact-finding-mission-myanmar.

Human Rights Watch “Myanmar’s Investigative Commissions: A History of Shielding Abusers,” research report (Human Rights Watch, September 2018), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/supporting_resources/201809myanmar_commissions.pdf.

Human Rights Watch “Myanmar: Events of 2022,” in World Report 2023 (Human Rights Watch, 2023), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2023/country-chapters/myanmar.

Azeem Ibrahim The Rohingyas: Inside Myanmar’s Hidden Genocide (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2018).

International Crisis Group “The Dark Side of Transition: Violence Against Muslims in Myanmar,” research report (International Crisis Group, 2013), https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/dark-side-transition-violence-against-muslims-myanmar.

International Crisis Group “Identity Crisis: Ethnicity and Conflict in Myanmar,” research report (International Crisis Group, August 28, 2020), https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/312-identity-crisis-ethnicity-and-conflict-myanmar.

N. Leddy “Six Years After the Myanmar Military Committed International Crimes Against the Rohingya, Survivors Are Still Seeking Justice in Courts Around the World” (Opinio Juris, August 25, 2023), https://opiniojuris.org/2023/08/25/six-years-after-the-myanmar-military-committed-international-crimes-against-the-rohingya-survivors-are-still-seeking-justice-in-courts-around-the-world/.

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