Iraq

TJET Focus Country

This page presents a country report and describes data that TJET has compiled on regime transitions, intrastate conflict episodes, and transitional justice mechanisms. For details on the data included on this page, view the FAQ.

For Iraq, TJET has collected information on: 23 amnesties between 1975 and 2016; 28 domestic trials starting between 1970 and 2014; eleven foreign trials starting between 2002 and 2019; two international trials starting between 2005 and 2006; one reparations policy created in 2009; and one vetting policy starting in 2003.

Select any transitional justice mechanism in the table below to view a timeline in the figure.

Conflict Year

Democratic Transition Year

Author of country report: Phuong Pham

Introduction

Iraq is located in Western Asia, bordering Turkey, Iran, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria. Its diverse landscape includes mountainous northern regions, deserts, and the fertile Mesopotamian plain between the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, where civilization first emerged. Iraq has an estimated population of around 44.5 million people. A majority (75-80%) are Arab, 15-20% are Kurdish, and 5% comprise various ethnic minority groups (including Turkmen, Assyrian, Yazidi, Armenian, and others). Approximately 60-65% of Iraqis are Shia Muslims, while 32-37% are Sunni Muslims.

Iraq possesses some of the largest proven oil reserves worldwide, which historically formed the backbone of its economy. Oil exports still dominate government revenues today. However, decades of war and instability have damaged Iraq’s infrastructure and hindered economic development.

Regime Context

TJET records no democratic transitions in Iraq between 1970 and 2020.

Iraq was established as a kingdom in 1932 following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. Great Britain played an influential role in the country’s creation and maintained control through a mandate. Iraqi politics were turbulent from the beginning, as tribal groups and factions vied for influence, resulting in instability and multiple changes in leadership through coups in the 1930s and 1940s. In 1958, the monarchy was overthrown in a coup led by Abd al-Karim Qasim, marking the establishment of Iraq as a republic. However, Qasim’s rule also proved unstable, and he was deposed and executed in 1963.

The Ba’ath Party then rose to power, establishing an authoritarian regime led first by Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and then by Saddam Hussein, who became president in 1979. Saddam transformed Iraq into a brutal dictatorship over the next 24 years, violently suppressing any opposition and cultivating a cult of personality. During this time, Iraq engaged in a costly eight-year war with Iran from 1980-1988 that resulted in over a million casualties. In 1990, Saddam’s regime invaded and annexed neighboring Kuwait, leading to the 1991 Gulf War that saw a US-led coalition liberate Kuwait and bomb Iraqi forces out of the country.

In March 2003, the United States invaded Iraq. On April 9, 2003, Iraq’s capital and political epicenter, Baghdad, fell to U.S. forces, thereby marking the official collapse of Saddam Hussein and the Ba’athist regime that had long controlled nearly every aspect of Iraqi society for more than 24 years. The collapse of the regime and the subsequent occupation by U.S. forces, however, led to further destabilization, ultimately inciting insurgent operations against Iraqi national forces, coalition forces, and civilians across the country. Since this time, Iraq has experienced political turbulence and unprecedented violence in both frequency and nature.

On July 13, 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) established the Governing Council as the temporary Iraqi administration. The 25-member Council appointed by the CPA used a governing formula based on Iraq’s ethno-sectarian proportions: 13 Arab Shi’a, 5 Arab Sunni, 5 Kurds, 1 Christian, and 1 Turkmen were appointed to the Council. This power-sharing formula has been applied to every governmental body established in Iraq since 2003. This power-sharing dynamic, however, helped unveil deep rifts within Iraqi society, with most Sunnis rejecting the Shi’a majority’s governance of the country and sparking a wave of sectarian violence.

Taking advantage of Sunni disempowerment and a security vacuum left in the wake of U.S. de-Ba’athification, vetting and disqualification policies, Al-Qaeda, the militant organization founded by Osama bin Laden, gained a foothold in Iraq in 2004. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian militant, pledged allegiance to Osama bin Laden and officially established the militia group Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, otherwise known as Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Up until his death in 2006, Zarqawi and AQI galvanized many Sunni insurgents, including former members of the Ba’ath regime and security forces, to conduct wide-scale attacks against military, governmental, and civilian targets. One such attack was the destruction of the Alaskarri Shrine in Samara, considered one of the holiest shrines in Shi’a Islam, on October 22, 2005. This particular attack sparked widespread sectarian violence, triggering one of the most violent chapters of conflict between Sunni and Shi’a in Iraqi history.

While sectarian violence and civilian deaths overall decreased after 2007, Iraq was not void of strife, violence, and displacement. The inability to provide security, stability, and protection remained. The withdrawal of American forces, announced by U.S. President Barack Obama on August 31, 2010, contributed to the creation of another security vacuum that Iraqi forces were ill-equipped to fill. Politically, socially, and economically, Iraq’s Sunnis continued to feel marginalized, as demonstrated by Sunni protests against Nuri al-Maliki in 2012 and 2013, which resulted in clashes with Iraqi security forces and some armed groups. Unfortunately, many underlying grievances remain unaddressed. After a couple of iterations and changes in leadership, the extremist group formerly known as Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) would find itself under the tutelage of Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, who subsequently rebranded the group as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).

Conflict Context

Based on the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, TJET records 18 violent intrastate conflict episodes between 1970 and 2020 (during 42 calendar years), involving eight distinct armed opposition groups fighting against the government. Six conflict episodes were internationalized by involvement of external state actors.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions. Source: UCDP Dyadic Dataset version 23.1, https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/index.html#dyadic.

On June 10, 2014, after taking control of Fallujah and other towns in Anbar governorate and forcing thousands of Iraqi security forces to retreat, ISIL attacked and gained control over the city of Mosul in northern Iraq. They then swept across the west and north of Iraq, attacking and occupying other significant cities, including Tikrit and Biji. Shortly after that, on June 28, 2014, Al-Baghdadi announced the establishment of a caliphate in the territories occupied by ISIL. In doing so, Al-Baghdadi also officially changed the name of ISIL to the Islamic State (IS) and chose Mosul as the caliphate’s capital. By August 2014, ISIL occupied nearly one-third of Iraq, stretching from the Syrian and Jordanian borders to the outskirts of Baghdad.

In practice, IS imposed a radical version of the Islamic Shari’a—Islamic religious law principally based upon the teachings of the Qur’an and Hadith, the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad—upon its followers and others within its occupied territories. According to this interpretation of Shari’a, non-Sunni Muslims, and other minority religious groups were considered apostates. No ethno-religious group was beyond their malice. IS targeted anyone, regardless of one’s ethnicity or religion, who refused to adhere to their extremist ideology, including, among others, Iraq’s Arabs, Kurds, Turkmen, Yazidi, Chaldeans, Assyrians, Shabak, Sunnis, Shi’as, and Christians.

Iraq’s Yazidi population, a minority ethno-religious group indigenous to northern Iraq known for its unique religious beliefs and practices, was explicitly targeted by IS and was subjected to hellish violence, crimes, and abuse. In August 2014, IS attacked the Yazidi homeland of Sinjar, committing massive human rights violations against the Yazidi community. Thousands of Yazidi women and girls were forced into sexual enslavement, and men were systematically murdered. The crimes committed by IS (and some local tribes who endorsed IS) were later classified by the United Nations as genocide. At the time of writing, more than 3,000 Yazidi women and children remain missing.

Following the Islamic State’s attack on Sinjar, on September 10, 2014, U.S. President Barack Obama announced the U.S. military plan to fight IS in Iraq and Syria. The same month, the Global Coalition Against Daesh, a partnership consisting of 80 countries, was established to counter and defeat IS. On the frontlines, the Coalition would be led by Iraqi armed forces and counter-terrorism teams. The Iraqi forces, with the assistance of coalition forces, would move from province to province, liberating territories from IS control. On July 10, 2017, the Iraqi government announced the liberation of Mosul, and over three years after the attack on Sinjar on December 9, 2017, the Iraqi Prime Minister, Haider al-Abadi, announced the total liberation of Iraqi territories from IS.

The Islamic State’s occupation of Mosul and other Iraqi territories is considered one of the most tenuous and politically fraught periods in Iraqi history. It is a period marked by gross human rights violations, massive infrastructural damage, especially in Mosul and Nineveh governorate, and overwhelming population displacement, with nearly 3.5 million internally displaced at its peak.

Transitional Justice

Accountability under the CPA

Following the collapse of Saddam and the Ba’ath regime, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)—a transitional government established by the United States—began implementing a series of vetting and disqualification policies, including de-Ba’athification. On May 16, 2003, the CPA issued order No.1 removing high-ranking members of the Ba’ath Party from the public sector, and then a few days later, on May 23, issued order No.2 disbanding the Iraqi army and other security apparatuses. These orders removed everyone in the top four ranks of the party from public service, and also vetted the top three layers in each government ministry. In the end, somewhere around 85,000 were driven out of government. Tens of thousands of Ba’athists, as well as hundreds of thousands of Iraqi army soldiers, security officers, and educators, suddenly lost their jobs, losing much of the power, privilege, and income they had enjoyed during Saddam’s Ba’athist regime. A massive security vacuum ensued, providing opportunities for insurgent groups to form and gain recruits.

The policy and its execution were by all accounts problematic. It was arbitrarily implemented by a series of different bodies, its sanctions and appeals processes were non-transparent, and it was politicized by Shiite political parties seeking to marginalize Sunni rivals. It recklessly targeted thousands of teachers who had to join the Ba’ath party just to maintain employment. And it ultimately forced skilled administrators underground. In some cases, those who lost employment went on to help organize the insurgency, and to contribute to the ISIS advance across Northern Syria.

In December 2003, Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) sought criminal accountability against senior members of the Saddam regime. The Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) – known first as the Iraqi Special Tribunal and later as the Iraqi High Tribunal – was established in 2003 by the CPA to investigate war crimes committed by the Saddam Hussein regime.The Tribunal had jurisdiction over major international crimes committed from July 17, 1968 (when the Ba’ath party seized power in Iraq) to May 1, 2003 (the end of the Ba’ath party ruling). Saddam Hussein and dozens of regime officials were tried and convicted for committing international crimes, including crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide. While not explicitly called a “truth commission,” the IST also had some truth-seeking functions besides prosecuting high-level officials. It operated from 2003-2006.

Government of Iraq Efforts

In January 2004, the CPA delegated authority to the Governing Council to create the Iraq Property Claims Commission (later renamed the Commission for the Resolution of Real Property Disputes), which addresses land-related violations under the Ba’ath regime. In 2009, Iraq also established a more reparations policy. Law No. 20 of 2009 on Compensating Victims of Military Operations, Military Mistakes and Terrorist Actions was created to provide redress to victims “for deaths, injuries, and damage affecting work, study or property” since March 20, 2003, when the US invasion began. The law was amended in 2015 to change administrative procedures and to add kidnapping to the list of harms compensated. The law presented an important first step and opportunity for the Government of Iraq to regain the trust of its citizens after emerging from the fight against ISIS. However, the law was not implemented as designed. It is unclear how much money from the national budget was set aside to pay victims’ compensation, and it seems few victims have actually received compensation. The lack of government follow-through resulted in low levels of civilian confidence and satisfaction.

In 2005, Iraqi policymakers issued Law No. 13, the Anti-terrorism Law, in response to the unprecedented scale and number of terrorist attacks experienced post-2003. At the time, the Iraqi Code of Criminal Procedures was insufficiently equipped to address the crime of terrorism. Thus, a new law was deemed necessary. The Central Criminal Court, a counter-terrorism court established by the CPA in 2003, was charged with implementing the new law, which was criticized because of its vague definition of “terrorism.” Despite its controversial past, the 2005 Anti-terrorism Law is still in effect, and it is currently being used to prosecute members and affiliates of Islamic radical groups, including those of the Islamic State.

In 2008, the Iraqi government established the High Commission for Human Rights to investigate human rights abuses under Saddam Hussein as well as later violations during the occupation and civil war. It was mandated to establish the facts about past crimes, provide reparations to victims, and help promote reconciliation. However, it faced challenges in implementing its mandate and is seen as having had limited impact and effectiveness. Though it is meant to perform investigations, the High Commission is not the same as a truth commission because it is a permanent, not a temporary body.

In 2017, the Government of Iraq (GoI), in response to public demand and recognizing its limited capacity to conduct a thorough investigation, requested United Nations assistance to hold the Islamic State (IS) accountable for its crimes. In response, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed resolution 2379, thereby establishing an independent investigative team to collect, preserve, and store evidence of crimes committed by IS in Iraq that could amount to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Specific language was added to the resolution to respect Iraq’s sovereignty so that the GoI could maintain a vital role in the documentation, investigation, and prosecution process. However, the resolution does not state that the perpetrators of international crimes should be prosecuted in Iraq. At this time, evidence-gathering is ongoing, with efforts focusing primarily on (1) IS attacks against Yazidi in Sinjar, (2) crimes committed by IS in Mosul, and (3) the mass killing of Iraqi Army cadets at Camp Speicher in Tikrit.

Concurrently, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), having accepted millions of internally displaced Iraqis, established a special committee, the Committee for Investigation and Gathering Evidences (CIGE), led by an investigative judge, to gather evidence of the crimes committed by IS against the Yazidi and other minorities on and after August 3, 2014, in Sinjar and Nineveh Plain. Since the CIGE does not have any arrest or prosecutorial powers, the goal of the Committee is to bring evidence and cases before international courts. Despite mounting evidence of international crimes, however, there continues to be disagreement, both internationally and nationally, about which courts should prosecute IS crimes. To date, the CIGE has documented about 2,000 cases.

Most recently, in 2021, the Yazidi law in Germany was developed to explicitly assists survivors of the ISIS genocide who fled to Germany. The Yazidi Survivors Law passed in Germany in 2021 recognized the genocide against Yazidis by ISIS in Iraq and Syria in 2014. It aims to support Yazidi refugees in Germany through monthly compensation payments ranging from €400-1000, access to services and facilitated legal residency and family reunification. The law acknowledges the ongoing threats faced by Yazidis in Iraq and Syria.

Transitional Justice Data

As of 2020, Iraq ranks 9th out of 174 on TJET’s legacy of violence index. For a full list of country rankings over time, view the index page, and for an explanation of the index, view the Methods & FAQs page.

Amnesties

Iraq had 23 amnesties between 1975 and 2016. Eight were passed during ongoing internal armed conflict. 14 amnesties released political prisoners. Three amnesties forgave human rights violations.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

Domestic Trials

TJET has compiled data on 28 domestic prosecutions between 1970 and 2014. These include ten regular human rights prosecutions of state agents, in which 33 persons were convicted; twelve intrastate conflict prosecutions of state agents, in which 44 persons were convicted; and nine opposition prosecutions of state agents or opposition members, in which 32 persons were convicted. In twelve trials that involved high-ranking state agents, 40 persons were convicted.

Click on accused records for data on convictions. Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

International or Hybrid Trials

Nationals of Iraq were subject to two international prosecutions between 2005 and 2007, which led to 14 convictions. The ICC's Office of the Prosecutor carried out a preliminary examination of the situation in Iraq from 2014 until 2020.

Click on accused records for data on convictions. Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

Foreign Trials

Nationals of Iraq were defendants in eleven foreign prosecutions in Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden beginning between 2002 and 2019.

Click on accused records for data on convictions. Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

Reparations Policies

Iraq mandated one reparations policy in 2009. TJET found no information on the total number of beneficiaries or evidence on implementation.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

Vetting Policies

Iraq had one vetting policy, starting in 2003; TJET found no information on whether or when the policy ended.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

UN Investigations

Iraq was subject to six UN investigations between 1984 and 2023. Two investigations aimed to encourage domestic prosecutions. One investigation aimed to collect evidence for prosecutions.

Data up to 2020. Hover over column labels for definitions.

Download Country Data

References

“Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 2,” August 23, 2003, https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/cpa-iraq/regulations/20030823_CPAORD_2_Dissolution_of_Entities_with_Annex_A.pdf.

CNN “Al-Zarqawi Group Claims Allegiance to Bin Laden” (CNN, October 17, 2004), http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/17/al.zarqawi.statement/.

Fred Abrahams “A Face and a Name. Civilian Victims of Insurgent Groups in Iraq,” research report (Human Rights Watch, October 2, 2005), https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/10/02/face-and-name/civilian-victims-insurgent-groups-iraq.

Edward Wong “Hussein Charged With Genocide in 50,000 Deaths,” The New York Times, April 5, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/05/world/middleeast/hussein-charged-with-genocide-in-50000-deaths.html.

Robert F. Worth “Blast Destroys Shrine in Iraq, Setting Off Sectarian Fury,” The New York Times, February 22, 2006, https://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/22/international/middleeast/blast-destroys-shrine-in-iraq-setting-off-sectarian.html.

Amnesty International “Iraq: Unjust and Unfair: The Death Penalty in Iraq,” research report (Amnesty International, April 2007), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/mde14/014/2007/en/.

James Dobbins, Seth Jones, Benjamin Runkle, and Siddharth Mohandas “Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority,” research report (Rand Corporation, 2009), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG847.pdf.

CNN “ISIS Fast Facts” (CNN, August 8, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/08/08/world/isis-fast-facts/index.html.

Barack Obama “Statement by the President on ISIL” (whitehouse.gov, September 10, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/statement-president-Isil-1.

Martin Chulov, Fazel Hawramy, and Spencer Ackerman “Iraq Army Capitulates to Isis Militants in Four Cities,” The Guardian, June 12, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/11/mosul-isis-gunmen-middle-east-states.

IILHR, MRG, NPWJ, and UNPO “Between the Millstones: The State of Iraq’s Minorities Since the Fall of Mosul,” research report (IILHR; MRG; NPWJ; UNPO, February 2015), https://minorityrights.org/app/uploads/2024/01/between-the-millstones-english.pdf.

Mark Thompson “How Disbanding the Iraqi Army Fueled ISIS” (TIME, May 29, 2015), https://time.com/3900753/isis-iraq-syria-army-united-states-military/.

BBC “How the Battle for Mosul Unfolded” (BBC News, October 19, 2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-37702442.

BBC “Iraq Conflict: Civilians Suffering ’Staggering’ Violence - UN,” BBC News, January 19, 2016, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35349861.

Fanar Haddad “Shia-Centric State Building and Sunni Rejection in Post-2003 Iraq” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 7, 2016), https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/01/07/shia-centric-state-building-and-sunni-rejection-in-post-2003-iraq-pub-62408.

Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic “They Came to Destroy: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis,” research report (OHCHR, June 15, 2016), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A_HRC_32_CRP.2_en.pdf.

Margaret Coker and Falih Hassan “Iraq Prime Minister Declares Victory Over ISIS,” The New York Times, December 9, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/09/world/middleeast/iraq-isis-haider-al-abadi.html.

Zachary D. Kaufman “New UN Team Investigating ISIS Atrocities Raises Questions About Justice in Iraq and Beyond” (Just Security, September 28, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/45411/expect-team-investigating-isis-atrocities-iraq/.

Physicians for Human Rights “Building Forensic Capacity to Document, Collect, Identify, Analyze, and Preserve Evidence of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity in Northern Iraq” (Physicians for Human Rights, July 2017), https://phr.org/issues/investigating-deaths-and-mass-atrocities/teaching-training-capacity-building/capacity-building-in-iraq/.

“Resolution 2379 (2017),” September 21, 2017, https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n17/296/25/pdf/n1729625.pdf?token=qdY0cSHvM7sGgmOWRD&fe=true.

Reema Hibrawi “One Year Post-ISIS: Iraq Is on the Right Path, but Must Take Further Steps” (Atlantic Council, December 10, 2018), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/one-year-post-isis-iraq-is-on-the-right-path-but-must-take-further-steps/.

United Nations “Investigative Team Making ‘Significant Progress’ Gathering Evidence to Prosecute ISIL/Da’esh for Atrocity Crimes in Iraq, Special Adviser Tells Security Council” (United Nations, July 15, 2019), https://press.un.org/en/2019/sc13882.doc.htm.

Global Coalition “The Global Coalition Against Daesh,” December 21, 2023, https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/mission/.